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Abstract
The choice in this Article is to focus on a limited number of points, and then to offer some
general conclusions. The plan is to move as much as possible on a chronological basis, starting
with the early confrontation in 1962 with the notification process under Regulation 17 and arriving
at Council Regulation No. 4064/89 (the “Merger Regulation”), treating in between individual
aspects of practice, such as dealing with the DG-IV staff, sources of law, the role of economics,
and the role of national courts. The potential scope of each of these points of course leaves wide
options to an author. The treatment in this Article is given with the hope that the reader may find
themes that strike responsive chords. If the effect is only to stimulate thought, the undertaking will
have been worth the effort.
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INTRODUCTION
The content a reader might expect from the title of this
Article is not immediately obvious. Indeed, it would seem to
give a blank check to the writer. And it is certain that no two
practitioners would do the same thing with the possibilities offered. The subject tempts the writer simply to reminisce and
to pontificate-to develop favorite topics at the expense of
what might have been more useful to the reader. These traps
may not have been avoided, but at least the recognition of the
dangers should have been salutary.
We note that the title is not European Economic Community (the "EEC" or "Community") competition law, but rather
practice, although practice is obviously so close to the law that it
is often not possible to see the dividing line. Nevertheless, the
thrust of the Article is not on the law as such but on the
problems with which counsel have been confronted, the way in
which the Commission of the European Communities (the
"Commission") and to some extent the European Court of
Justice (the "Court of Justice"), have reacted to those
problems and influenced the conditions of practice, the roles
counsel-both in-house and outside counsel-have taken on,
and the perceptions counsel have had of the way the practice
has developed. The comments will also include some prospects for the future which a review of the past may suggest-at
least issues for future consideration, not necessarily answers.'
1. For a detailed and enlightening review of EEC competition law based on historical perspective, see D. G. GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAW (1988). A review some
years ago by a Commission official of many of the themes treated in the present Article is found in Jean-Franqois Verstrynge, Current Antitrust Policy Issues in the EEC: Some
Reflections on the Second Generation of Competition Policy, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.

673 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1985). Seven years later another Community official with a
similar background convincingly promoted EEC competition policy from "second
generation" to "maturity." Jonathan Faull, The Enforcement of Competition Policy in the
European Community: A Mature System, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 139 (Barry E.

344 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL 1A WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:342
In connection with this review, the Article will refer occasionally to the status of the law and of the Community institutions.2
The significance of the term "thirty years" in the title will
probably be obvious to most readers. It was in 1962 that the
practice of EEC competition law began, upon the issuance of
Council Regulation No. 17/62 ("Regulation 17").3 Over the
preceding four years the seed had been there-the automatic
nullity provision of Article 85(2) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (the "EEC Treaty")'-but, of
course, nothing had happened. The issuance of Regulation 17
was an energizing shock.
The mechanism of the "grace period" allowed by Regulation 17 for notifications, in order to obtain retroactive validity,
seemed itself to have a marked effect. There was a rush of
many companies to notify by the second deadline of January
31, 1963-perhaps to a considerable extent under an assumption of a legal obligation to notify. U.S. companies were prominent among these notifiers.
During the five to ten years following issuance of Regulation 17, the atmosphere for practice of EEC competition law
was formed by certain salient characteristics. First, there prevailed a strong skepticism on the part of European companies
about the significance and practical impact of the new rules.
On the other hand, major U.S. companies involved in Europe
often showed a real interest and seemed generally to take the
matter more seriously, no doubt primarily because of their
own experience with U.S. antitrust law.
Fundamental legal
issues were still being debated, many of which may seem curious today, but which at that time were very real, for example,
whether Article 85(1) applied to vertical restrictions.5
Hawk ed., 1992) [hereinafter Faull, Enforcement of Competition Policy], reprinted in 15

L.J. 219 (1991-1992).
2. Developments will be traced through papers published by the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, and in that connection the present Article should be considered
an additional tribute to the contribution of its Director, Barry E. Hawk, Esq., as well
as to the efforts of those who have produced the papers.
3. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 195962, at 87 [hereinafter Regulation 17].
4. Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85(2), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 298
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958), amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [treaty as amended referred to hereinafter as EEC Treaty].
5. For a major contribution in these early years to the understanding of the new
FORDHAM INT'L
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The Directorate-General for Competition ("DG-IV") staff
seemed determined to develop and maintain its own approach,
in particular without wanting to appear to rely on approaches
of the U.S. or German authorities on the same issues. Of
course, this is in part easily understandable. Already in the
early 1960s the concept of market unity was the dominant
force in EEC competition law, and that in itself was a valid reason for the Commission to strike an independent course.
However, it seemed, even at that time, that the concentrated
focus on the concept of market unity may have been leading
the Commission into ignoring from time to time certain
precepts of sound competition-based analysis.
From the point of view of the practitioner, a central feature of that initial period was the existence of a small and specialized competition bar. This group was characterized by a
certain pride, and even fervor, among a relatively small group
of specialists. Each one knew almost everyone else active in
the area, and each one knew a substantial percentage of the
DG-IV staff. These early conditions have, of course, undergone constant mutations, and today the landscape is in most
respects, for better or for worse, beyond recognition when
compared to those days.
So much for nostalgic reminiscences. Let us turn now to
the development of the law and, in particular, of the practice of
the law. At the beginning, counsel had little guidance. Once
Regulation 17 was issued there were detailed procedural rules,
and those have, of course, held up rather well over the ensuing
thirty years-a tribute to the drafters. As readers will know,
before the end of 1962 the Commission had also issued two
interpretative notices-one on patent licensing6 and one on
commercial agency agreements. 7 And, of course, these have
held up much less well.'
rules by U.S. companies, see ARVED DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EURO.PEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC RULES OF COMPETITION
(ARTICLES 85 TO 90) INCLUDING THE IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVES (1968).
6. Communication relative aux accords de licence de brevets, 139 J.O. 2922
(1962), withdrawn by OJ. C 220/14 (1984).
7. Communication relative aux contrats de representation exclusive conclus
avec des repr6sentants de commerce, 139 J.O. 2921 (1962).
8. Certainly the patent and agency notices were welcome and gave counsel food
for thought for many years. However, the general nature of the patent notice offered
little guidance. The agency notice, on the other hand, had the unintended effect of
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The sustained desire for greater legal certainty publicly
demanded by counsel throughout the Community over a long
period was satisfied only little by little, and, of course, even in
the long run only in part. Case law began to develop slowly,
very slowly, but a number of the cases in the 1960s laid down
important fundamental principles for evaluating both horizontal and vertical arrangements under Article 85 of the EEC

Treaty. Counsel were enlightened by a few big cartel cases, a
number of market unity/export restraint cases, and in 1967 by
the first block exemption regulation on distribution agreements.9 Despite the prominence of the cartel cases, application of the market unity concept to vertical agreements involving private companies was the dominant theme.' 0
By 1972, the Commission was able to issue its First Report
on Competition Policy, covering the years 1962-197 1." The First
Report listed fifty-one cases decided under Articles 85 and 86 of
the EEC Treaty, of which only three related to Article 86. Of
those fifty-one cases, nineteen had been decided in 1971. All
three of the Article 86 cases had been decided in 1971: they
were GEMA,' 2 S.I.A.E. ,ms and Continental Can. 4 The acceleration was obvious. It brought on not only regulations but also
"case law" in every form, including formally decided cases, novirtually eliminating all agency agreements, whether covered by the notice or not,
from the field of European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC] competition law,
at least until the European Court of Justice [hereinafter Court of Justice] began to
give substance to the rules on agency agreements. The area of agency agreements is
still the source of guesswork, 'while waiting for the Commission of the European
Communities [hereinafter Commission] to complete. a new notice.
9. Commission Regulation No. 67/67, 57 J.O. 849 (1967), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1967, at 10.
10. For an article by the present Competition Director-General, which not only
reviews the past emphasis but sets forth the future goals of the Commission, see
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Contributionof EC Competition Policy to the Single Market, 29
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 257 (1992).
11. In particular, in the early years the annual Commission Reports on Competition
Policy [hereinafter Reports] were an extremely valuable tool for practitioners not only
as documentation but also as an expression of the Commission's views as to the policy it was following and as to the significance of each of the cases. As time went on,
the Reports decreased somewhat in relative value, as non-official documentation increased and as the Commission found other ways to express publicly its policy and to
comment on its cases, and also as the Reports began to appear later and later in the
year following that to which they related.
12. J.O. L 134/15 (1971), [1971] C.M.L.R. D35.
13. J.O. L 254/15 (1971), [1972] C.M.L.R. Dl12.
14. J.O. L 7/25 (1971), [1972] C.M.L.R. DII
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tices of intention to take favorable action, press releases, and
the annual Commission Reports on Competition Policy (the "Reports").
In the 1970s, counsel saw the first move toward merger
control and noted the continuation of the Commission's preoccupation with applying Articles 85 and 86 to vertical agree15
ments. The 1980s saw a number of trade association cases
and some traditional big cartel cases and the development of
the law in new directions, in particular through a series of important block exemption regulations. The focus had remained
on application of the competition rules to private companies,
but in the latter part of the decade, there were more and more
developments relating to state-controlled monopolies and to
private sectors of the economy where the state was much involved. The EEC competition law system had reached a new
stage of development. Whole new practice areas were added
at a steady clip. The financial and service areas were developed by new case law, 16 as was the agricultural sector. 17 Detailed competition rules were issued for the various sectors of
the transport industry.' 8 Telecommunications and the media
15. See John Temple Lang, Trade Associations and Self-Regulation Under EEC Antitrust Law, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 605 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1985); see also
David S. Evans, Trade Associations and the Exchange of Price and Nonprice Information, in
1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 709 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); Aldo Frignani, Some
Critical Thoughts on EEC Antitrust Policy Towards TradeAssociations, Vehicles Distributionand
FranchisingAgreements, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 583, 590 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1985). Since these articles were written, the Commission has adopted an important
decision on information exchanges in UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange, O.J. L 68/19 (1992). The decision has been appealed. Fiatagri U.K. v. Commission, Case T-34/92, O.J. C 149/8 (1992); John Deere v. Commission, Case T-35/
92, OJ. C 149/9 (1992).
16. The Commission listed the banking and insurance sectors for the first time
in its Thirteenth Report, which covers 1983. CoMMIsSION THIRTEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY
67-69 (1984) [hereinafter COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT]. The following year it devoted a section to the subject in the "Main decisions
and measures by the Commission" chapter of the Report. COMMISSION FOURTEENTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
74-79 (1985) [hereinafter COMMISSION FOURTEENTH REPORT]. The following year, the Commission simply called the section "Decisions in the services sector." COMMISSION FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLicy
68-71 (1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION FIFTEENTH REPORT].
17. See Tom R. Ottervanger, Antitrust and Agriculture in the Common Market, in 1989
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 203 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).
18. In its Report for 1983, the Commission began keeping readers up-to-date as
to preparation of transport rules. COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 16, $
47. The first decisions in the transport sector were listed in the Report covering 1985.
COMMISSION FIFTEENTH REPORT, supra note 16, 74. For a recent survey showing the
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were brought into focus.' 9 The Commission finally turned its
attention to the energy sector.20 State monopolies subject to
Article 90 of the EEC Treaty came under closer scrutiny, 2 ' as
did the obligations of the Member States in regard to EEC
competition rules. 22 And throughout this decade the Commission became increasingly active in controlling the grant by
Member States of competition-distorting aid to enterprises,
both private and state-controlled.2 3
Today, even a casual observer is struck by the rapid advance of EEC competition law. An annual review of U.S. antitrust law shows a complex but slow progression resulting
mainly from a multitude of court cases, with legislation by and
large affecting only the fringes, more like the movement of a
glacier. The image produced by an annual review of EEC competition law is more like that of an avalanche, where the flow of
extent of development of air transport law, see John Temple Lang, Air Transportin the
EEC-Community Antitrust Law Aspects, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 287 (Barry E.
Hawk ed., 1992); see also John Balfour, The EC Competition Rules and Airport Access, in
1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 397 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992).

19. See Colin Overbury & Piero Ravaioli, The Application of EEC Law to Telecommunications, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 271 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); Peter-Ar-

min Trepte & Vernon E. Vig, Telecommunications, "Public" Undertakings and Procurement
Obligations, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 313 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).

20. The Commission first included an energy section in its Report covering 1989.
32 (1990).
21. See John Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and Government Measures Relating to Public and PrivilegedEnterprises: Article 90 EEC Treaty, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 543 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1985); Giuliano Marenco, Legal Monopolies in the CaseCOMMISSION NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

Law of the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.

197 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992); Aurelio Pappalardo, Measures of the States and Rules of
Competition of the EEC Treaty, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 515 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1985); PietJan Slot, Public Enterprises Under EEC Law: The Lame Ducks of the Nineties?, in
1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 255 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992); Richard Wainwright,
Public Undertakings Under Article 90, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 239 (Barry E.

Hawk ed., 1990).
22. See Ren6 Joliet, National Anti-Competitive Legislation and Community Law, in
1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 16-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989); Pierre Pescatore, Public and Private Aspects of Community Competition Law, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
381 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987); Jean-Francois Verstrynge, The Obligations of Member
States As Regards Competition in the EEC Treaty, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 17-1
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989).

23. See Manfred Caspari, State Aids in the EEC, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1984). State aids constitute an important part of the work of the
Directorate-General for Competition [hereinafter DG-IV]. Directorate E, which is
devoted exclusively to State aids, included 21% of DG-IV personnel in 1991 (78 out
of a total of 373). Practice under the rules for State aids is distinct and different from
that under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, which is the thrust of this Article.
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new legislation is all important and where the central role
played by the Commission allows important changes often with
little or no notice.
The accelerating pace of these developments has, of
course, had a profound impact on the nature of EEC competition law practice. There are many more lawyers involved, of
many nationalities, a substantial number of those lawyers having offices in Brussels. Big companies have opened offices in
Brussels to keep a watch on Community developments, and
lawyers in those offices have begun to function in a government-relations capacity that gets them involved in competition
matters.
Also, the pace of life in the law continued to accelerate
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Counsel had enjoyed some
protection thanks to a leisurely postal system, but the facsimile
machine put them at the mercy of clients who could be, and
often were, on the other side of the planet. Specialties among
EEC competition lawyers tended to develop on a sector-bysector basis, since it was no longer possible for any one person
to have all subjects in his grasp, certainly not within the response periods clients demanded.
Faced with such a situation, how can an author dealing
with a subject of this kind find a guideline for self-restraint?
Choices have to be made. The choice in this Article is to focus
on a limited number of points, and then to offer some general
conclusions. The plan is to move as much as possible on a
chronological basis, starting with the early confrontation in
1962 with the notification process under Regulation 17 and arriving at Council Regulation No. 4064/89 (the "Merger Regulation"),24 treating in between individual aspects of practice,
such as dealing with the DG-IV staff, sources of law, the role of
economics, and the role of national courts. The potential
scope of each of these points of course leaves wide options to
an author. The treatment in this Article is given with the hope
that the reader may find themes that strike responsive chords.
If the effect is only to stimulate thought, the undertaking will
have been worth the effort.
24. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in O.J.
L 257/13 (1990) [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
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I. THE CHALLENGES OF THE NOTIFICATION PROCESS
Regulation 17 took care of many important points, once it
was adopted by the Council in 1962, but probably the most
significant was the institution of the notification process. 5
That event created enormous interest. No one quite knew
what to make of the notification phenomenon at the time. A
lot of people are still in that state. However, much has been
learned over the years, in particular about the practical limitations of the process.
The early suspicion that the notification process would be
important turned out to be true. Its importance in the day-today work of counsel can hardly be overstated. For any counselor regularly consulted by companies negotiating an agreement, in dispute-as to the enforceability of an agreement, or
subject to an investigation concerning an agreement, the factor
of notification can be a critical one, shaping counsel's advice.
Indeed, over the years it has provided tremendous challenges
to counsel, as they attempt to reconcile as best they can the
technical and pragmatic considerations involved. This Article
will focus on these challenges. It,will not attempt to provide a
manual for operating the process.
The origin of the problem goes back to the days of the
drafting of the EEC Treaty. As will be well-known to most
readers, a basic choice was made in devising Article 85 not to
adopt the U.S. approach, which would have implied a simple
prohibition later subject to the broad application of a Rule of
Reason to temper the absoluteness of the prohibition. With a
perspective of thirty-five years since the EEC Treaty was
signed, we ought to be able to venture a judgment as to
whether that choice was a wise one. Many counsel have serious
doubts, the author included. However, that question today
seems largely academic., The choice was made. For better or
for worse, the choice has been or is now being repeated in new
Member .State legislation, 6 and it must be lived with. Apart
25. Approximately three months later, the Commission issued Regulation No.
27, which implemented the procedure for applications for negative clearance and
notifications for exemption and set forth the format. Commission Regulation No. 27,
35 J.O. 1118 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 132, amended by:J.O. L 189/1
(1968), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968-I, at 400, amended by O.J. L 172/7 (1975), amended
by O.J. L 240/1 (1985).
26. For a review of such legislation, see generally Kurt Stockmann, Trends and
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from the impact of block exemption regulations, such modification of the system as takes place will almost certainly be
through case law, it being almost inconceivable that the wording of Article 85 will be changed.
What did the EEC Treaty's choice of the exemption system mean, from counsel's point of view? The issues are well
known, the principal ones being (a) whether there is a legal
obligation to notify any agreement or concerted practice that
might reasonably be thought to have the effects described in
Article 85(1), (b) the role that risk of fines will play in a decision to notify, (c) the circumstances in which the risk of unenforceability will suggest that notification be made, and (d) the
reactions counsel can expect from the Commission either to
the filing of a notification or to a failure to notify.
The answers to these questions only began to become
clearer after a rather long period. Indeed, even today there
are broad areas of uncertainty. Nevertheless, thirty years of
operations under the system have allowed norms and expectations to be established. Counsel have become more comfortable with the notification process, although the variety of approaches is still extreme.
As to whether the parties to a potentially restrictive agreement have a legal obligation to notify, counsel had to wait
quite a while before the Court of Justice confirmed that there
was no such obligation.2 7 Of course, this response left counsel
with the burden of weighing the considerations that go into
deciding whether to take advantage of the opportunity to notify.
Insofar as the immunity from fines is concerned, it became
reasonably clear over a period of time that the immunity derived from a notification has been a less important incentive to
notify than was probably thought by the persons who invented
the system. As experience showed, the risk of fines is high in
Developments in European Antitrust Laws, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST 441 (Barry E.

Hawk ed., 1992) [hereinafter Stockmann, Trends and Developments] (referring to the
laws of Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which couple a prohibition of restrictive practices with an exemption procedure). The Commission's annual
Reports on Competition Policy follow these developments.

27. SA Musique Diffusion Frangaise v. Commission, Joined Cases 100-03/80,
[1983] E.C.R. 1825, 1902, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 221, 331.
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the case of abuses, export restrictions, and cartels. 2' However,
these are the areas least likely to be the subject of notifications.
It is rare that a notification will be filed to cover a potentially
abusive agreement, for reasons that are in large part obvious. 29
As for export restrictions, if counsel advised the notification of
an outright export restriction, the step would in most cases reflect on his familiarity with EEC law. Of course, there do exist
possibly justifiable contractual provisions that operate as export disincentives about which counsel might want a notification to protect against fines. As to notification of cartels, counsel have had occasion to become familiar with the limited category of cartels which might possibly be entitled to an
exemption. This is not a rich area for notifications.
In respect to a notification to avoid the risk of invalidity,
and to obtain the possibility of an exemption with retroactive
effect to the date of notification, counsel sometimes discovered, after considerable thought, that there did exist situations
where the critical nature of the risk of invalidity would in itself
suggest notification. However, in practice, these situations
seemed to be rare.
In regard to what counsel could expect from the Commission upon a failure to notify, counsel for some time feared a
negative reaction. However, finally there seemed to be no convincing evidence that parties to an agreement that turned out
to be entitled to an exemption had been seriously prejudiced
by delaying notification until circumstances appeared to demand it. There was fear in some circles that an injury could
result from a negative bias on the part of the Commission toward a notification filed only when an agreement ran into
trouble. No doubt such situations did arise, but the consideration came not to seem a critical one.
As to the Commission's possible reaction to a filing of a
notification, in the early years it was clear that the Commission
was not likely to be able to react at all for a long time, if ever.
This left a lot of counsel perfectly content. The clients contin28. A rough count as of July 30, 1992 reveals that approximately 82% of the
fines have come within these categories: 19% involved abuse of dominant positions,
29% were based on price-fixing or other cartel activities, and 34% concerned export
bans or other restrictions on parallel imports.
29. Of course, in theory, a notification of an abusive agreement would not protect against fines, but, in practice, it does in most cases.
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ued operations as if the agreement had been exempted. Indeed, once the lack of reaction came to be expected, it happened that notifications were filed upon the basis of such an
expectation. Today the situation has changed radically, and it
seems that such an expectation is no longer prudent. The pace
of arrivals of new notifications is such that, in theory, they can
be screened without much delay, allowing the Commission at
least to establish a priority on cases to be treated.3 0 Few applications request formal approval, and the Commission may allow a notification that causes no alarm to sit for a very long
time before reacting or even giving any evidence it has read
the notification. If the notification arouses particular interest,
the parties may receive an enquiry letter from the Commission
in the weeks or months following the notification.
We noted earlier that the attitudes of counsel toward actual practices of the notification system tend to vary widely.
Confrontations on the issue between counsel involved in negotiation of new agreements have been frequent and often prolonged. The situation has sometimes arisen from opposing
business interests of the parties, but it is also fair to say that, in
the past at least, the trends have run by nationality to a certain
extent. There appeared to be "notifying" nationalities and
"non-notifying" nationalities. British counsel tended to advise
notification, in particular in the years immediately following
U.K. accession. From the beginning, French and Italian counsel tended not to. German counsel were in a special situation
because of their healthy respect for the Federal Cartel Office
(the "FCO") and often close personal working relationship
with it. But generally it seems that while they regularly consulted the FCO, the Germans were not a "notifying" crowd in
Brussels.
Habits of relevant national law, or lack of it, and patterns
of national practice of course played a role. Under U.K. law
there still exists a mandatory notification procedure, albeit on
terms virtually unrelated to the EEC rules. U.S. companies
were unaccustomed to notification, in light of U.S. practice.
On the other hand, the larger U.S. companies by and large
tended to be compliance-oriented, and, from the beginning,
30. In 1991, notifications arrived at the pace of about one per working day-a
total of 282 for the year.
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the U.S. companies normally were willing to consider at length
with counsel the advisability of notification. At the same time,
in-house counsel of those U.S. companies, who frequently
were bound vis-A-vis management by a strict antitrust compliance program to conform to EEC and other competition rules,
faced their own dilemma. They did not want to approve
clauses contrary to Article 85(1) of the'EEC Treaty, and, on the
other hand, did not want to notify; thus, they were interested
in finding a reasonable basis to justify not filing a notification.
Disagreements of counsel on whether to notify continue
to arise, of course, and no doubt always will. However, over
time a greater sophistication has developed among counsel
who deal with the matter regularly, leading to a somewhat
more uniform approach. This seems to have led to a more selective use of the notification process. Let us look at the evolving attitudes.
A. How to Notify
The early notifications were often brief, amazingly so. A
review of the notifications dated January 31, 1963 (the deadline under Regulation 17 for two-party agreements to benefit
from retroactive effect) is instructive in this regard. Questions
could have been raised at the time as to whether such succinct
notifications were valid, meaning, among other things, effective in preventing fines, but the Commission seems not to have
pursued this possibility except in cases where a restriction objected to was not included in the notification. The issue in any
event seems to have been eventually resolved in large part by
the Court of Justice.3 '
The situation changed considerably in 1985 when the
Commission issued its revised Form A/B and the detailed instruction note.3 2 New standards of precision were set, and
31. De Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Belangen des Boekhandels (VBBB) v.
Eldi Records B.V., Case 106/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1137, 1148, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 719,
734-35. The Court ofJustice held that if the full agreement was attached to the notification, it could not be rejected because the Form A/B failed to identify all of the
restrictive clauses. Id. at 1149, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 735. It would seem a fortiori
that the Commission could not reject a form for providing insufficient market data.
The Form CO used under the Merger Regulation is, of course, governed by different
rules.
. 32. Commission Regulation No. 2526/85, OJ. L 240/1 (1985).
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DG-IV even made available a most useful sample notification
that was relatively brief. Whether notifications filed after that
amendment often met the Commission's expectations for completeness is another question. It seems unlikely that they did.
Most often, each notification will be more or less complete depending on what counsel conceive to be the minimum the situation requires. Of course, counsel's concepts of the minimum
will vary dramatically. On the other hand, some notifications
are made overly long by the inclusion of unnecessary material.
In such cases, the Commission staff may well miss the few jewels in the haystack.
As for the future, we might supposethat becoming accustomed to filing a detailed and complete form under the Merger
Regulation, counsel might be inclined to file a more complete
Form A/B than in the past, in particular in connection with
cooperative joint ventures.33 Counsel may expect more rapid
informal reactions from the Commission if the notifications are
helpfully complete. On the whole, however, the minimalist approach seems likely to prevail.
B. Whether to Notify
As we have noted, attitudes of counsel have evolved in regard to whether to notify, although the nature and extent of
the changes are difficult to assess because of the continuing
range of attitudes. It is in part a question of how counsel have
conceived their own role. Companies will often want simply to
be told whether to notify. On the other hand, the process is
one of weighing a series of often complex factors. Business
decisions are involved, for example, whether to amend the
agreement to avoid the question, or to sign the agreement with
the terms the parties want and which counsel consider possibly
exemptible and then notify it. Regardless of who makes the
decision, obviously counsel bear a heavy responsibility in guiding a company's decision. At times there have arisen suspi33. In this connection, a significant problem in notifying under Regulation 17 is
the need to identify the relevant markets, but without having had the benefit of the

consultation process usually involved with filing a notification under the Merger Regulation. It is understandable that counsel will not want to tie companies down to a
defined market, and, furthermore, somewhat doubtful that the markets identified in a
notification on Form A/B would correspond to those that would be found by the
Commission.
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cions that counsel have advised notification because it can in
itself be an interesting piece of legal work that does not go
unremunerated, and in the long term can lead to even more
interesting work in negotiating with the Commission on the
matter. Sometimes the situations have been such that a recommendation to notify hardly seems justifiable on any basis other
than counsel's affection for the notification process-although
it is dangerous to leap too quickly to presumptions of this kind
in view of the variety of attitudes counsel sincerely hold as to
the notification process. In-house counsel, on the other hand,
will often have a strong bias against notification, for reasons
that are for the most part obvious.
From the company's point of view, it has appeared over
the years that often in a company's final decision to file a notification it is a question of that company's concept of its own image. Is it a "complier" in competition law matters? A complier
may tend to notify when there is a significant restriction as to
which the company can present no reasonable case for a negative clearance because it does not want to be seen as "violating" Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. 'On the other end of the
spectrum, there are "stone-wallers." They will tend not to notify except in extreme circumstances, which might include the
virtual certainty that the operation will provoke either complaints from third parties or enquiries from the Commission.
A significant number of companies tend to be situated near
one end or the other of this spectrum. Many more adopt intermediate approaches. Some take the position that even a "complier" need not feel its "good citizen" obligation to notify an
agreement that is thought entitled to an exemption.
In any event, the process of deciding whether to notify is
often highly complicated, and the practitioner's approach
more sophisticated than the summary comments just given
might suggest. 34 Indeed, one gets the impression that the fre34. Various aspects of the notification phenomenon have been treated in the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute papers: Ian Forrester & Christopher Norall, The
Laicization of Community Law Self-Help and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law Is and
Could Be Applied, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 305 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1984);
Michael J. Reynolds, PracticalAspects of Notifying Agreements and the New Form A/B, in
1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 705 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1986); Mario Siragusa, Notifications of Agreements in the EEC-To Notify or Not To Notify, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 243 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987).
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quency of notification may be inversely proportionate to the
sophistication of the counsel. It seems likely that the filing of
most of the 282 Forms A/B made in 1991 could not be justified under any reasonable filing policy. On the other hand, a
large number of agreements probably could reasonably have
been filed and were not.
There is a question as to whether the Commission now
still wishes to encourage notifications. In the past, it has, for a
number of obvious reasons, including curiosity as to what was
going on, simplicity of enforcement and, in the end, control
over the situation and jurisdiction over practices, which in a
sense comes down to power. When the DG-IV staff has been
approached on a matter that could be considered to raise any
question of conformity with Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty,
while the staff has often seemed to want to be helpful, the recommendation almost invariably has been "go ahead and notify, and then we will see," or, in more favorable circumstances, "we think that is likely to be all right on the basics, but
notify and we will let you know." Less often, the response has
been "we think that it is all right for an exemption, but if you
don't notify we won't bother you unless there is a complaint."
Of course, there are a number of reasons for the staff to encourage a notification. One is that a Form A/B properly filled
out will give most of the pertinent data and arguments in the
organized fashion to which the DG-IV staff is accustomed and
allow a quicker informal response. Indeed, counsel have recently noticed an increased reluctance of the staff to give even
informal reactions before seeing a completed Form A/B.
In any event, the decision to notify is up to the company,
as guided by counsel. The company, after advice from counsel, has often hesitated to notify, not only because it did not
wish to go on record as to the relevant product market and
perhaps other elements of its business, but also because, and
perhaps more importantly, it feared that even when the basic
arrangement was clearly defensible, at least in terms of being
exemptible, the DG-IV staff would pick up a number of details
and demand changes in provisions that would almost certainly
never have raised troublesome legal problems were the agreement not to have been notified. And it must be said that experience over the years has tended to confirm fears of this kind.
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C. The Future?
In regard to the future, probably the most significant issue
is that of delays. The prospect of long delays has been a strong
deterrent to notification in the past, probably stronger than it
should have been. Companies have often asked counsel how
long it will take to get an exemption, meaning a formal decision, and on hearing the answer will sometimes want to leap to
the decision not to notify. Of course, the situation is not so
simple, since an overture to the DG-IV staff has in most situations allowed enough reassurance for the parties to proceed to
implementation of an arrangement without a formal response,
or even without a comfort letter actually in hand. Nonetheless,
the prospect of a delay is a significant element even when these
factors have been taken into account. More recently, counsel
have seen well-informed companies work hard to make a joint
venture "concentrative" in order to benefit from the relatively
short time periods the Merger Regulation imposes on the
Merger Task Force. The Commission's recent promise to act
relatively quickly (but perhaps not quickly enough) on notifications of'cooperative joint ventures is an important event for
joint ventures, but not necessarily indicative of the situation
companies will face in regard to other kinds of agreements. It
seems that despite the helpful measures taken, the Commission staff is still probably not equipped to take care of notifications as promptly as companies need.
As for counsel, the sameIdilemmas that have plagued them
in the past will most likely persist. However, the Commission
seems engaged, in the interest of all, in an endeavor to reduce
the occasions when a notification seems called for. New developments will modify the'conditions of this central part of EEC
practice: concepts such as those of ancillary restrictions (a
cousin of the U.S. Rule of Reason), additional block exemptions, and more and more precedents, notices, and regulations
to clarify still further the status of agreements. These we shall
consider one by one.
II. MIXED COMFORT FROM THE BLOCK EXEMPTIONS
Once it was seen what an impossible burden individual exemptions imposed on the Commission, it was obvious that
something had to be done. Block exemption regulations were
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an immediate, albeit partial, remedy. The use of block exemptions was, in fact, virtually inevitable, once the choice made by
the EEC Treaty drafters was interpreted to be that of a system
involving virtually automatic condemnations subject to exemption.
As is well known, the Community reacted rather quickly.
In 1965, only three years after the introduction of Regulation
17, the Council issued the first regulation authorizing the
Commission to issue block exemptions in defined areas 35 and,
only two years later, issued Commission Regulation No. 67/67
("Regulation 67/67"), covering both exclusive sales territories
and exclusive purchasing of goods for resale.36 Most of the
flood of notifications the Commission received in 1962 and
1963 related to distribution arrangements.3 7 A block exemption covering such agreements was thus the most needed, and
also the easiest to draft. While counsel may have had misgivings at first at the prospect of basically following a Commission-prescribed form for their distribution agreements, they
soon recognized that Regulation 67/67 was a success: short,
easy to read, logical, responding to a strong need, and, by and
large, corresponding to business reality. Counsel were troubled by numerous questions of interpretation, some of which
remain open today, even after the two new distribution regulations of 1983.38

Before the issuance of the block exemption regulation,
35. Council Regulation No. 19/65, 8J.O. 533 (1965), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 196566, at 35.
36. See Commission Regulation No. 67/67, 57J.O. 849 (1967).
37. The Commission received approximately 40,000 notifications in the first
years of the application of Articles 85 and 86. COMMISSION NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

1-2 (1990) [hereinafter COMMISSION NINTH REPORT]. Of these,

approximately 30,000 concerned exclusive dealing arrangements. The bulk of the
cases--over 25,000-were settled under Regulation 67/67. COMMISSION FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
48 (1972); COMMISSION NINTH REPORT, supra,
20-

22.
38. Commission Regulation No. 1983/83, O.J. L 173/1 (1983), corrected by OJ. L
281/24 (1983); Commission Regulation No. 1984/83, OJ. L 173/5 (1983), corrected
by O.J. L 281/24 (1983). An example of an issue left open is that of the dividing line
between a sale of a product for resale, which would enter into the scope of the block
exemption, and the sale of a product for use, which would not. The Commission
helped somewhat in §§ 9-10 of its 1984 Notice. Commission Notice Concerning
Commission Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83, §§ 9-10, O.J. C 101/2, at 3 (1984).
However, the Notice still left the matter very much open, and few Commission decisions have dealt with the problem, leaving pharmaceutical and other counsel in a
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practitioners had found distribution law to be a most uncertain
area. The 1967 regulation had a profound impact on them by
virtually codifying the field of exclusive distribution and of exclusive purchasing for resale. Dark corners continued to exist,
calling for the advice of counsel,3 9 but, by and large, legal work
in regard to distribution became less interesting. Selective distribution rose to replace this work in part. The principal
guidelines in that area became rather quickly traced through
the joint efforts of the Commission and the Court of Justice,
although the conceptual nature of the distinction between
quantitative and qualitative criteria left counsel much room for
speculation, and, in general, selective distribution remained an
interesting area of practice, 40 unaffected by block exemptions,
except in regard to automobiles.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the field of intellectual
property remained open for counsel who liked to speculate on
unclear subjects. EEC case law and the 1962 notice on patent
licenses left enormous space for such speculation, and this area
remained an active and interesting one for practitioners
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. Indeed, prior to the
issuance of the 1984 patent regulation,4 1 a number of EEC
competition lawyers spent a large percentage of their time advising on patent licensing matters, during the latter part of the
period on the basis of the successive drafts of the patent regulation.4 2 Once the patent regulation was issued in final form,
continuing effort over the last quarter. century to predict the dividing line that will
actually be set.
39. See Roger Daout, DistributionUnder EEC Law-An Official View, in 1983 FORD441 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1984); Helmut R.B. Schr6ter, The Application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to DistributionAgreements-Principles and Recent Developments, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 375 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1985); Floris O.W.
Vogelaar, The Overall Policy of the Commission Concerning Distributionin the Light of Recent
Developments: Some Capita Selecta, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 185 (Barry E. Hawk
HAM CORP. L. INST.

ed., 1987).
40. For a thorough review of the development of the law as of 1986, see Paul
Demaret, Selective Distributionand EEC Law After the Ford, Pronuptia and Metro IIJudgments, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 149 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987) [hereinafter
Demaret, Selective Distribution].

41. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, O.J. L 219/15 (1984), corrected by O.J.
L 113/34 (1985).
42. See Hartmut Johannes, Technology Transfer Under EEC Law-Europe Between the
Divergent Opinions of the Past and the New Administration:A Comparative Law Approach, in
1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 65 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1983); John Temple Lang,
European Community Antitrust Law andJoint Ventures Involving Transfer of Technology, in
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however, it was so detailed, albeit complex, that the bigger
companies tended to apply the regulation through their inhouse counsel, resorting to outside advisors only in special situations.43 Similar conditions existed before and after the issuance of the know-how regulation in 1988. 44
From counsel's point of view, the industrial property block
exemptions can also be counted as a success for the Commission. However, it may be noted that this success was due in
part to a willingness of the Commission to seek, over an extended period, the views of the legal profession and industrial
property circles in the drafting of the block exemption regulations, and to take those views into account to a considerable
degree.45 This fact is not without importance for the future,
both as notice to the Commission of the possible utility of such
consultation and as notice to the profession of its opportunity
to contribute to the development of EEC law in a useful way.
The other block exemptions had a lesser impact on the life
of practitioners. The franchising regulation,46 which can be
considered an adjunct to the distribution regulation, in its nar1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 203 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1983); Mario Siragusa, Technology Transfers Under EEC Law: A Private View, in 1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 95
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1983).
43. For a study of post-regulation patent issues, see James Venit, In the Wake of
Windsurfing: Patent Licensing in the Common Market, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
517 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987); see also Willy Alexander, The HorizontalEffects of Licensing a Technology As Dealt With By EEC Competition Policy, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L.

11-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989). The enforceability of patents and other intellectual property, closely related to licensing issues, is treated in Norbert Koch, Article
INST.

30 and the Exercise of Industrial Property Rights to Block Imports, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INST. 605 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987).

44. Commission Regulation No. 556/89, OJ. L 61/1 (1989). The situation at
that time is reviewed in Norman E. Rosen, New EEC Regulation on Knowhow Licensing,
in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 10-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989). The regulation had

been previewed two years earlier in Sebastiano Guttuso, Know-How Agreements, in
1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 477 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987).
45. Representations to the Commission on the successive drafts of the patent
regulation were made in many forms and over a long period, but the most spectacular event was the 1979 hearing, which involved a large number of counsel and the
Commission staff in prolonged confrontation on a wide range of issues.
46. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, O.J. L 359/46 (1988); see Jean-Eric de
Cockborne, New EEC Block Exemption Regulation on Franchising, in 1988 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 13-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989); Jean Dubois, Franchising Under EEC
Competition Law: Implications of the PronuptiaJudgment and the Proposed Block Exemption,
in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 115 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987); RogerJ. Goebel, The
Uneasy Fate of FranchisingUnder EEC Antitrust Laws, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
453 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1985); Alan Silberman, The EEC Franchising Regulation: A
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rower field seems quite usable by counsel. The 1985 research
and development regulation,4 7 on the other hand, raises such

acute problems of interpretation, which case law will probably
never resolve, that it has been of much less use than the
others. 48 The amendment of this regulation now planned will
not extend to clarification of the ambiguities. An interpretative notice would help.
The block exemptions profoundly modified the nature of
practice of EEC law, for better and for worse. For better, they
tended to give clarity and simplicity. For worse, they tended to
obscure -the reasoning process and rigidify the forms of contracts, and, to some extent, the freedom to contract.
As to clarity, much was quite straightforward and some
was not. The regulations introduced the art of interpreting the
block exemption, although counsel often disagreed as to the
rules of the art. Problems arose as to what a provision of the
regulation covered, or as to what kinds of unmentioned restrictions removed the benefit of the block exemption. More ob-

scure issues arose as to the "normative" values of block exemption regulations, i.e. the extent to which a block exemption
established rules applicable outside the scope of the regulation, "by analogy" in other cases.4" Also, counsel have somePotential Laboratory For Examining EEC Competition Policy, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 14-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989).
47. Commission Regulation No. 418/85, O.J. L 53/5 (1985).
48. A main source of the problem seems to be that the Commission had focused
on research and development [hereinafter R&D] joint ventures between competitors,
whereas most such ventures seem to be formed between companies in a vertical relationship, and the logic of the regulation's provisions concerning permissible and impermissible restrictions is much less obvious in the case of verticality. Also, the
meaning of certain key terms, such as "joint exploitation," was not sufficiently
spelled out. A further difficulty was apparently raised by the Commission's attempting to rush through the regulation by the end of a Commissioner's term in 1984. See
e.g., Demaret, Selective Distribution,supra note 40 (concerning the need for mature deliberation and consultation). For detailed studies of R&D under EEC law, see Alexis
Jacqmain & Bernard Spinoit, Economic and Legal Aspects of Cooperative Research: A European View, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 487 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1986); Jiirgen
Lindemann, A Practical Critique of the EEC Joint Research Rules and ProposedJoint Venture
Guidelines, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 341 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987); Denis
McInerney, Antitrust Scrutiny ofJoint Research and Development Ventures in the United States
and the European Economic Community, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 355 (Barry E.
Hawk ed., 1987).
49, See Council Regulation No. 19/65, supra note 35, art. 1(3), O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1965-66, at 36. For example, counsel have been known to advise use in nonexclusive distribution agreements or in agreements not involving distribution of the
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times wandered off the trail of logic by assuming that the
granting of a block exemption to certain clauses means that
such clauses always need an exemption.50 In doing so, they
have failed to stop and think, for example, whether in a certain
situation the exclusivity was not restrictive and did not call for
counsel to subject an agreement to the format of the block exemption regulation.
Counsel have encountered particularly difficult issues concerning the extent to which coverage under, a block exemption
precludes attack of the practice in question under national
competition law. 5 ' The Commission is undertaking a somewhat timid and partial explanation in its forthcoming notice on
the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty in the
national courts. 5 2 It remains to be seen, however, how the
Commission's statements will be interpreted by the national
courts and the national authorities, in particular when it comes
to block exemptions, as opposed to individual exemptions.53
export restraints exempted by Regulation 1983/83. The Commission itself seems to
have contributed to confusion in this respect by stating that the "hiring out of goods
in return for payment comes closer, economically speaking, to a resale of goods than
to a provision of services" and can, therefore, be "covered by the Regulations,"
which of course cover only goods for "resale." 'Commission Notice Concerning
Commission Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83, supra note 38, §§ 8, 12, O.J. C 101/
2, at 3 (1984). On the basis of such reasoning, the two distribution regulations might
also be deemed to cover non-integrated agency relationships, since they also might
be thought to "come closer" to resale than to services.
50. In the industrial property regulations, the Commission, having waited for
the Court ofJustice to rule, did take this point into account by including as a recital
the acknowledgment that under L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, Case 258/78,
[1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278, an exclusive grant was not necessarily a
restriction under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. However, this step seems not to
have served to cancel the frequent assumption just described. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, 11, O.J. L 219/15, at 16 (1984); Commission Regulation No.
556/89, 6, O.J. L 61/1, at 2 (1989). The "white" clauses, exempted by the regulation when exceptional circumstances make an exemption needed, are, of course, in a
different: category.
51. The issue of the way in which the rule of the priority of Community law over
national law actually works in practice is one of the most complex and susceptible to
arcane and erudite pronouncements from scholarly quarters that EEC competition
law has so far produced. The subject was treated more clearly than it normally is in
Kurt Stockmann, EEC Competition Law and Member State Competition Laws, in 1987
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 265 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988).

52. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (regarding Commission's position on application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty by Member State courts).
53. Not surprisingly, Member States tend to think they should have a considerable degree of liberty in regulating activity covered by block exemptions. The issue
has arisen recently in connection with possible regulation by the U.K. competition
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The problem comes up in connection with the reported position of the Irish authorities that agreements covered by an
EEC block exemption such as Regulation 1983/83 should nev54
ertheless be notified under the new Irish competition law.
From the practical point of view for counsel, to a certain
extent the block exemptions serve the role that an EEC Rule of
Reason would have served, had there been one of general applicability. The subject will be pursued below, in connection
with a review of counsel's search for a Rule of Reason.
III. LOOKING FOR A RULE OF REASON
It was in 1962 that EEC competition lawyers began asking
themselves in earnest by what criteria a contractual restriction
should be judged under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. They
are still asking the question. Will every restriction on the commercial freedom of an independent party need an exemption
to be enforceable, as long as it has an appreciable effect in the
market and also may have an appreciable impact on trade between Member States? Or will only "unreasonable" restrictions fall under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty? Obviously no
question can be more central to daily life in the practice of
EEC competition law.
The indications that counsel got from the Commission,
and also from the Court ofJustice in the early years, suggested
that the first answer should be counsel's working hypothesis.
A restriction was a "restriction." However, many jurists absorbed in EEC law continued to pursue the subject, arguing
that the approach of the U.S. courts in the years following
adoption of the Sherman Act 5 5 should be followed in Europe,
at least insofar as the existence of the exemption procedure
permitted.5 6
authorities of automobile distribution practices permitted by the EEC block exemption regulation covering automobile distribution, Commission Regulation No. 123/
85, OJ. L 15/16 (1985); MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, I NEW MOTOR
CARS:

A

REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF NEW MOTOR CARS WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM,

1992, Cmnd. 1808, at 370-71, 399. The issue raised by the report was not resolved,
and probably will not be until the Court has ruled again on the matter, in somewhat
more precise terms than it did in Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68,
[1969] E.C.R. 1, [1969] 8 C.M.L.R. 100.
54. Competition Act, No. 24 (1991) (Ir.).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
56. Judge Joliet, at an early date and long before he joined the Court ofJustice,
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Meanwhile counsel continued to confront the issue at
every turn in their practice-in counseling on drafting of
agreements and their enforceability, on advising whether to
notify, or in completing the Form A/B. They may have hesitated to go so far as to argue to the Commission in a pending
matter that a "Rule of Reason" should apply, at least not in
5
those wordsY.
That would have been asking too much of the
Community authorities-to accept so directly an American
concept that at least at first glance appeared incompatible with
the exemption structure of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Indeed, it seems to be only during the last few months that DGIV staff members are willing to go so far as to use the term
"Rule of Reason" to refer to what approach the Commission
may or may not take in a given area-and even that is only in
conversation.
In other words, in conceptual terms the issue with which
the practitioner of EEC competition law has been faced from
the beginning is that of the dividing line between that which
can be given a negative clearance and that which is enforceable
only upon exemption. In more practical terms, counsel asks
what chances there may be later to show that an agreement is
examined the issue in depth through a comparative law approach.

RENC JOLIET, THE

RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAw: AMERICAN, GERMAN AND COMMON MARKET LAW
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

(1967).

57. In this Article, the term "Rule of Reason" refers, unless a different sense is
clearly applicable, to the concept as currently known in U.S. case law. "Ancillary
restriction" will refer to the doctrine being developed in EEC law that is similar to
the U.S. doctrine of "ancillary restraints." Although the relationship between the
U.S. Rule of Reason and the concepts of similar nature that have developed in certain
areas of EEC competition law are complex, there does exist a close relationship. It
has been described by a number of writers. See, e.g., Barry E. Hawk, The American
(Anti-trust) Revolution: Lessons for the EEC?, 9 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 53 (1988);
Bastiaan van der Esch, EC Rules on Undistorted Competition and U.S. Antitrust Laws: The
Limits of Comparability, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 18-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1989); see also J.E. Ferry, The Repose of Certainty and the Necessity of Uncertainty, in 1978
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. I (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1979).
The U.S. Rule of Reason has been summarized on countless occasions. For a
recent forward-looking summary, see Phillip Areeda, A Second Century of the Rule of
Reason, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 143 (1990). He lists three determinants for applying the
U.S. rule: (i) the type of threat to competition, (ii) whether the restraint is of sufficient
magnitude to be "unreasonable," and (iii) whether the challenged conduct has any
redeeming virtues that outweigh the detriments it might cause. Were this lucid and
simple formulation to be applied in a study of EEC competition law decisions over
the last 30 years, a great deal could be determined about the nature of the Community decision-making process and where it is going.
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enforceable when it is challenged, without having recourse to
the uncertainties and delay of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty.
While both counsel and the Commission have occasionally ignored this distinction, it can obviously be critical.5 8
The need for an EEC Rule of Reason was to a certain extent and in certain limited areas taken care of by the block exemption regulations.5 9 However, whatever their virtues, the
block exemptions are obviously only a partial solution to the
problem of legal certainty and only a very limited application
of a Rule of Reason.6" The block exemptions leave untouched
58. An agreement or a clause of an agreement that needs an exemption but does
not have one will not be enforceable in court. In principle it can also be the basis of
fines, although in the many borderline cases that tend to raise this problem, fines are
hardly ever a problem. Thus, if an exclusivity clause comes within the rule of the
Court of Justice's judgment in L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, Case 258/78,
[1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278, as being an ancillary restriction, or of the
judgment in Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 935,
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 210, as not being of appreciable impact on competition or on
trade between Member States, it is enforceable without an exemption. Otherwise,
only if it comes within a block exemption or has been given a specific exemption will
it be enforceable.
59. For example, exclusive patent licenses are automatically exempted, at least
in the absence of non-exempted restrictions, just as they would tend to be valid
under a U.S. Rule of Reason. Of course, block exemptions are generally easier to
apply with certainty to a given factual situation than is a Rule of Reason. As noted,
there has always been a strong drive in the Community for legal certainty. The block
exemptions did provide a degree of certainty, at least for the areas covered. An EEC
Rule of Reason would not, of course, provide the same degree of security to a company but would, after a time, provide a considerable degree of security and an analytical framework that would allow greater flexibility not only as to agreements within
the specific area of the present block exemptions but also in regard to agreements
that for one reason or another simply fell outside the scope of any block exemption.
60. The Commission set out to fill holes one at a time by a block exemption per
industry. The automobile regulation, Commission Regulation No. 123/85, OJ. L
15/16 (1985), is now the subject of re-evaluation prior to its expiration in 1995. An
insurance regulation will be added. Council Regulation No. 1534/91, O.J. L 143/1
(1991) (authorizing the Commission to adopt a block exemption for the insurance
sector); Draft Commission Regulation, OJ. C 207/2 (1992) (draft block exemption
for certain agreements, decisions, and concerted practices in the insurance sector).
Competition in the transport sector is the subject of separate procedural rules, which
also cover the Commission's grants of block exemptions in that sector. Transport
was specifically excluded from the scope of Regulation 17 by Council Regulation
141/62, 124J.O. 2751 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 291, amended by 210
J.O. 3141 (1965), amended by 306J.0. 1 (1967). Subsequently, procedural regulations
were adopted to apply EEC competition rules to transport by rail, road, and inland
waterway, J.O. L 175/1 (1968), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968-I, at 302, maritime transport, O.J. L 378/4 (1986), and air transport, O.J. L 374/1 (1987), amended by OJ. L
122/2 (1991), amended by OJ. L 240/18 (1992). The Commission was given the
power to grant certain block exemptions in the air transport sector, OJ. L 374/9

1992-1993]

EEC COMPETITION RETROSPECTIVE

many important areas of commercial activity, most of which
will never be covered by a block exemption. The comfort they
have given to counsel, and to the Commission, is great as far as
it goes.

At the beginning counsel gathered that anything in the nature of an EEC Rule of Reason might well be limited to a few
well-defined areas, the resale restraint involved in selective distribution being an early and simple example. 6'

However, it

was clear that the decisions applying these concepts were not
legislative acts, and it seemed that if they were to be explained
it could only be on the' basis of some legal principle which
would necessarily apply outside the narrowly limited fields involved in the cases decided. For a long time, counsel could
distinguish no recognition by the Commission or the Court of
Justice of a broadly applicable principle. Then the term "ancillary restriction" began to appear, apparently first in connection with joint ventures.62 A number of years later the use was
(1987), amended by O.J. L 217/15 (1990), amended by O.J. L 240/19 (1992). It has used
this authority to adopt block exemptions that currently govern ground handling services, O.J. L 10/7 (1991), certain consultations relating to capacity, slot allocations,
and tariffs, O.J. L 10/14 (199i), and computer reservation systems, o.J. L 10/9
(1991). Proposed regulations would amend and extend the latter two block exemptions. In the maritime transport sector; the Council has authorized the Commission
to grant block exemptions for certain agreements between liner shipping companies,
termed "consortia." O.J. L 55/3 (1992). In regard to block exemptions, see generally supra text accompanying notes 35-54.
61. The concept was applied in connection with selective distribution in the
SABA case, first by the Commission in 1975, O.J. L 28/19 (1976), [1976] 1 C.M.L.R.
D61, and then by the Court ofJustice in 1977. Metro SB-Grossm5rkte GmbH & Co.
KG v. Commission, Case 26/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1875, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1. There
were other significant developments during the following decade. The Commission's
1979 notice on subcontracting arrangements was clearly based on the concept. In
1982, exclusivity clauses in the license of intellectual property were made subject to
such an analysis by the Court ofJustice in L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, Case
258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278. Further, in 1985, in connection
with a non-compete covenant for the sale of a business, the Court of Justice developed the concept in Remia BV and Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia N.V. v. Commission, Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 1. The Court ofJustice in
that case was in fact building upon a concept used by the Commission in Reuter/
BASF, O.J. L 254/40 (1976), [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. D44, and pursued by the Commission in Nutricia/de Rooij and Nutricia/Zuid-Hollandse Conservenfabriek, O.J. L
376/22 (1983), [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 165. In 1986, restraints in a franchising agreement were recognized by the Court of Justice as being covered by such a concept in
Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, Case 161/84,
[1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414.
62. Jonathan Faull,JointVentures Under the EEC Competition Rules, 5 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 358 (1984).
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made a subject of EEC regulatory law by its inclusion in the
Merger Regulation.6 3 At the time the Commission in its Notice
Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations 64 even
ventured to use the term "reasonable" in defining the legal
limits of an ancillary restriction.
But despite the fact that the list of applicable circumstances has grown to such a degree, the real test of the outer
limits of this area of law may well come forth more clearly in
the reasonably near future in development of EEC competition
law as it relates to commercial agency agreements.6 5
While even an attentive observer may be unsure as to
where the law now stands in this regard, it is clear that we have
seen an important evolution over the years. It is also clear that
no attempt should be made in this paper to provide a restatement of present law.6 6 We shall content ourselves to look
upon the struggle of counsel to see more clearly on this subject
all these years, and in that connection to search for the exact
role of "reason" in EEC competition law. When will reason
63. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, OJ. L 257/13 (1990); see Commission Notice Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations, O.J. C 203/8 (1990); Donald
L. Holley, Ancillary Restrictions in Mergers andJoint Ventures, in 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 423 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991) (developing the distinction, not necessarily always of practical use, between those restrictions that are "inherent" in a valid transaction and those which are "ancillary").
64. O.J. C 203/8 (1990).
65. In connection with DG-IV's prolonged work on a notice on agreements with
commercial agents to replace the 1962 Notice, see COMMISSION TWENTY-FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
133 (1992) [hereinafter COMMISSION TWENTY-FIRST
REPORT], it seems that one of the more difficult issues to resolve is that of what restrictions a principal can impose on an agent that is not integrated, and how the
acceptance of such restrictions can be explained as a matter of EEC competition law.
66. The Fordham Corporate Law Institute papers are of particular importance
in this regard. The subject was examined in depth in two 1987 papers: Helmuth
R.B. Schr6ter, Antitrust Analysis Under Article 85(1) and (3), in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 645 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988); Michel Waelbroeck, Antitrust Analysis Under Article 85(1) and Article 85(3), in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 693 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1988). However, case law continues to move, and it would be useful to have an annual review of this subject. Professor Michel Waelbroeck devoted a section to the
subject in his 1989 review, Michel Waelbroeck, Annual Review of EEC Competition Cases
1988-1989, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 181, 190-91 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).
For a brief, but useful, status report, see Faull, Enforcement of Competition Policy, supra
note 1. In what is certainly an interesting thesis that warrants further study, Mr. Faull
sees the EEC Rule of Reason as it now stands and as it may develop limited to an
ancillary restriction doctrine adjusted to exclude restrictions which divide the Community on territorial lines, at least until the single market is firmly established.
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alone prevail? When must resort be had to the exemption process?
Would a full-blown EEC Rule of Reason provide the longsought-for certainty? No doubt it would not. But that is no
valid ground for counsel to resist its growth. The continued
development of an EEC Rule of Reason should be welcomed
by counsel. Such growth as has already taken place constitutes
an enormously important development. While it complicates
legal analysis for counsel and places a burden on the Commission and the national courts, it permits a much needed flexibility in EEC competition law that so far has been lacking. The
EEC competition law system has tended to work easily only if
an agreement fits in one of a series of pigeon-holes covered by
a block exemption or other "safe harbor" or if it has the explicit approval of a small group of officials looking out for a
huge segment of the world's economy.
In retrospect, it seems that the calls of counsel and scholars for a broader acceptance of a Rule of Reason in EEC law
have not gone unheard, in particular at the Court of Justice,
and that there is not only a hope but also an expectation for a
continued development and clarification of the underlying
principles and the scope of their applicability. Counsel will
continue to bear a responsibility of pressing for development
of these concepts, in particular when dealing with DG-IV, and
later as appropriate before the Community courts in Luxembourg as well as in national courts. DG-IV on its side will bear
the responsibility of taking seriously the analysis of these matters, without waiting for counsel to press the issue upon them.
The matter is, of course, closely related to that of economic
analysis, discussed below.
IV. SOME TURNING POINTS IN CASE LAW THAT HAD AN
IMPACT ON PRACTICE
While the process may seem somewhat of a detour from
the main subject, the author cannot resist, perhaps in part
from nostalgia, reviewing briefly a few important cases that
have had a particular impact not only on the shape of EEC
competition law but also on that of the daily life of persons
practicing that law.
It does happen from time to time in the history of the law
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that a whole field is created, overnight, and the next morning
its provisions are sitting there, to a considerable extent empty
of meaning, waiting to be given some content not only by the
regulators and the courts but also, and first, by counsel. It is
an awesome responsibility. The entry into effect of the EEC
Treaty in 1958 brought about such a moment. This was in particular the case in regard to competition law-that being one
area of supranational law subject to immediate application by
the Commission, at least as soon as the procedural rules were
in place, which of course occurred in 1962.
A fascinating aspect of the practice of EEC competition
law over the thirty-year period, and one that has brought great
personal satisfaction to many counsel, is observing the irregular but constant development of the law-and from time to
time participating in that development. Each practitioner who
has worked during a substantial part of this period will have a
personal view of which are the important events. There follows one such list of fifteen EEC cases that have had a marked
impact on the development of professional life for the practitioner.6 7
A. Grundig-Court ofJustice, 1966; 61 Commission, 196469
The judgment was the first one rendered by the Court of
Justice on an appeal from a Commission decision. Counsel to
a party in the case told the author several years later that the
case had decided all the fundamental points of EEC competition law. While that is probably an overstatement, so many
fundamental points were settled that the case may fairly be
considered the grandfather of the many developments which
followed. Absolute territorial protection had been sought for a
national distribution system, and it was made clear to legal advisors what value the Commission and the Court of Justice
would place on the unity of the market. Intrabrand competition had to be protected by Article 85(1), even though it might
be at the expense of interbrand competition. Article 85 did
apply to vertical agreements. These and other points settled
67. The cases are arranged by order of the date of the judgment on review by
the Court of Justice when there was such a review.
68. Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH
v.
Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
69. Grundig-Consten, 161 J.O. 2545 (1964), [1964] C.M.L.R. 489.
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by Grundig are now accepted by EEC counsel as not only fundamental but obvious.
B. Deutsche Grammophon-CourtofJustice, 1971 70
When the Court ofJustice introduced the "free-flow" concept of Article 30 into the competitive relationship between
companies by limiting the ability of a copyright owner to block
parallel imports of copyrighted items marketed in another
Member State with the owner's consent, it in one stroke filled a
void, and in effect created a new area of law over which many
counsel were to devote years of work. The Article 30 rules
have, of course, been continuously developed since 197 1,71
although the development now seems to be slowing before the
law has reached maturity.
One important impact on practitioners was immediately to
integrate the world of intellectual property into that of EEC
competition law. A new group of practitioners, previously only
marginally concerned, was brought into the EEC competition
world. The revolutionary interpretation of Article 30 seems
now, in retrospect, to have been a salutary step in the development of the EEC legal system, but the immediate response
both from existing EEC counsel and from the new group
sometimes bordered on consternation, occasionally *mixed
with indignation.
C. Raymond-Nagoya-Commission, 1972 72
To the surprise of many, the Commission accepted jurisdiction to rule upon an export prohibition imposed on a Japanese licensee by a French licensor. The concept of the potential effect on trade between Member States, as well as the
70. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmirkte GmbH
& Co. KG, Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L'R. 631.
71. See HARMUT JOHANNES; INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT IN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAw (1976); Willy Alexander, The Applicable Rules of EEC Law: Antitrust
and the Free Movement of Goods, in 1974 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 209 (Barry E. Hawk
ed., 1975); Norbert Koch, Article 30 and the Exercise of Industrial Property Rights to Block
Imports, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 605 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987); Guy J.
Pevtchin & Leslie Williams, Pharmon v. Hoechst: Limits on the Community Exhaustion Principle in Respect of Compulsory PatentLicenses, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 287 (Barry
E. Hawk ed., 1987); Bastiaan van der Esch, IndustrialProperty Rights Under EEC Law, in
1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 539 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1984).

72. J.O. L 143/39 (1972), [1972] C.M.L.R. D45.
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broad territorial scope of the EEC rules in general, became
much clearer to counsel.7 3
D. Dyestuffs-Court ofJustice, 1972; 71 Commission, 1969 71
For the first time the Court of Justice defined a concerted
practice, and defined it in broad terms that prepared counsel
somewhat for the broader language of the Court of Justice in
the 1975 Sugar cases. 76 The Court of Justice also confirmed at
least one basis for the applicability of EEC law to companies
situated outside the Community (a basis extended in the Court
of Justice's judgment in Wood Pulp, treated below).
E. Continental Can-CourtofJustice, 1973; 77
Commission, 1972 78
The Continental Can case seemed at the time to signal the
beginning of merger control when the Court of Justice sustained the Commission's idea, if not its implementation, to apply Article 86 to an acquisition of a competitor by a dominant
company. The immediate practical impact was limited, as
could have been foreseen, 79 because the concept was not considered to permit control of the constitution of a dominant position. The case did, however, begin almost immediately the
real process of merger control when in July 1973 the Commission submitted to the Council a draft merger regulation. This
was the beginning of the process that culminated in 1989 in
73. The jurisdictional dimension of Articles 85 and 86 based on a potential effect on trade between Member States has been of great importance to practitioners.
Case law has proceeded by small steps, not always in the same direction. See
Jonathan Faull, Effect on Trade Between Member States and Community: Member StateJurisdiction, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 485 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).
74. Imperial Chemical Indus. v. Commission, Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619,
[1972] C.M.L.R. 557;J.R. Geigy AG v. Commission, Case 52/69, [1972] E.C.R. 787,
[1972] C.M.L.R. 557; Sandoz AG v. Commission, Case 53/69, [1972] E.C.R. 845,
[1972] C.M.L.R. 557.
75. Dyestuffs, J.O. L 195/11 (1969).
76. Co6peratieve vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission, Case 40/73,
[1975] E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295.
77. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, Case 6/72,
[1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199.
78. Continental Can, J.O. L 7/25 (1972), [1972] C.M.L.R. D11.
79. See Karen Banks, Mergers and PartialMergers Under EEC Law, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 373 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988), reprinted in 11 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
255 (1987-1988); Valentine Korah, Joint Ventures (Exemption or Clearance), Mergers and
PartialMergers, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 429 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988).
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the Merger Regulation, that very important development with
so many implications for counsel as well as companies.
F. SHV/Chevron--Commission, 19748o

In setting forth the grounds for acceptance without the
need for exemption of a "partial merger" that resulted in an
entity jointly held by companies that had been competitors,
and where one of the parents remained a potential competitor
of the jointly held company, the Commission laid the basis not
only for counsel to exercise on countless occasions their ingenuity to arrange deals that would fit into this slot, but also for
the famous and counsel-consuming distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures set forth in the
Merger Regulation."'
G. Vacuum Interrupters-Commission, 197782
The Commission had occasion to examine jointly-held
companies in the preceding years, and had summarized these
activities in its Fourth Report on Competition Policy.83 However, it
was only in 1977 that it issued its first decision in what might
be considered a typical joint venture between competitors,
outside a special area such as nuclear energy. Almost every big
company in Europe was involved in one or more joint ventures, and very few of those had been notified. New joint ventures were being formed all the time. Counsel faced the issue
of whether to notify existing joint ventures, or only new ones,
or to lie low and hope for the best. Most counsel have never
fully resolved this dilemma.
80. SHV/Chevron, 0.J. L 38/14 (1975), [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D68.
81. In 1977, the Commission seemed to be drawing back from the partial
merger concept when it decided De Laval-Stork, 0J. L 215/11 (1977). In De LavalStork, the Commission determined, in circumstances not so different from those of
SHV/Chevron, that the parents remained potential competitors. De Laval-Stork,
OJ. L 215/11, at 14-19 (1977). However, in the end the partial merger doctrine
survived.
82. Vacuum Interrupters Ltd, 0.J. L 48/32 (1977), [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. D67.
83.

COMMISSION FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

37-42 (1975).

A

recent update on Commission policy concerning cooperative joint ventures is given
in Barry E. Hawk, Joint Ventures Under EC Law, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 557
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992) [hereinafter Hawk,Joint Ventures Under EC Law], reprinted in
15 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 303 (1991-1992).
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H. United Brands-CourtofJustice, 1978, 84
Commission, 19758 5
The United Brands case first showed the broad potential of
Article 86 in control of abuses of dominant positions, when the
Court ruled on a variety of abuses related to the banana market. While the leading demonstrative role of United Brands has
now been partially eclipsed by Tetra Pak II,86 it was United
Brands that brought Article 86 into the daily lives of counsel.
At the time, of course, it was not evident with what energy and
imagination the Commission would press the possibilities of
that EEC Treaty provision.

I. Hugin--Court ofJustice, 197987 Commission, 197788
When the Court ofJustice ruled that a cash-register manufacturer held a dominant position in regard to parts for its own
line, leaving the impression that the Commission's finding of a
duty to supply a former distributor would have been upheld if
trade between Member States had been affected, attention of
the legal profession was obtained throughout the Community.
While the case is rarely cited by the Commission or the Court
of Justice, it continues to raise vexing questions in the day-today life of counsel.
J. AM & S-Court ofJustice, 1982 89
The case which ruled on the extent of legal privilege in
EEC competition proceedings could hardly be omitted from
any list of attention-getting cases for counsel. The ruling
shocked in-house counsel, worried independent counsel who
were not members of an EEC bar, and visibly elated a number
of independent counsel who did belong to Member State bars.
The story is a long one, not yet finished. 90 For present pur84. United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 83.
85. Chiquita, O.J. L 95/1 (1976).
86. Tetra Pak II, Oj. L 72/1 (1992).
87. Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345.
88. Hugin/Liptons, O.J. L 22/23 (1978), [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. D19.
89. AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575,
[1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264.
90. See David Edward, Constitutional Rules of Community Law in EEC Competition
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poses, perhaps it suffices to say that the situation is not a comfortable one for companies and for counsel not members of
Member State bars, but it has not, for various reasons, produced the problems expected in 1982.
K. Nungesser-Court ofJustice, 1982; "' Commission, 197892
We have already had occasion to refer to Nungesser in connection with the growth of an EEC Rule of Reason. The case
had been recognized by counsel and the Commission as a future landmark long before it was decided. The drafting of the
patent regulation had been held up waiting for the Court to
rule on the enforceability of exclusivity and other clauses in
agreements dealing with rights to plant varieties. The judgment was fully as interesting as expected. 3 The case still
serves as a fundamental point of departure for analysis by
counsel of new problems.
L. Pioneer-Courtof Justice, 1983; Commission, 197995
The Commission's decision imposing a EUA4,350,000
"exemplary" fine on Pioneer Electronic Europe and substantial fines on its distributors in cases relating to exports between
Member States startled the business world and made it easier
for EEC counsel to focus attention of executives on compliance programs. While some four years later the Court reduced
the amount of fines slightly, the case continued to serve as a
warning. Since then, fines have more than kept up with inflation, of course, so far topped by Tetra Pak II at
96
ECU75,000,000.

Cases, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 383, 396-99 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990) [here-

inafter Edward, ConstitutionalRules], reprinted in 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 111 (19891990); Otfried Lieberknecht, Comments on ConstitutionalRules, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP.

L. INST. 419, 422 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).
91. L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015,
[1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278.
92. Breeders' Rights-Maize Seed, O.J. L 286/23 (1978), [1978] 3 C.M.L.R.
434.
93. See Eleanor M. Fox, Maize Seed. A Comparative Comment, in 1982 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 151 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1983).
94. SA Musique Diffusion Fran~aise v. Commission, Joined Cases 100-03/80,
[1983] E.C.R. 1825, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 221.
95. Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment, Oj. L 60/21 (1980), [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 457.
96. O.J. L 72/1 (1992). Tetra Pak has appealed the decision. Tetra Pak v. Commission, Case T-83/91, Oj. C 331/15 (1991). In regard to fines, see Faull, Enforce-
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M. Remia-Court ofJustice, 1985; 97 Commission, 1983 98
When the Court ofJustice basically approved the Commission's decision concerning the acceptability of non-compete

clauses to protect the purchaser of a business, it did so in
broad terms that recalled Nungesser, but the fact that the judgment was outside the area of intellectual property, in the more
general activity of buying and selling businesses, seemed to
give it added impact. Whether counsel immediately recognized the long-term potential of the case for their practice is
another question. A case along the same lines of Nungesser and
Remia was to follow in 1986 with Pronuptia.°9
N. Philip Morris-Court ofJustice, 1987; 100
Commission, 1984 101
In a sense the ruling of the Court ofJustice in Philip Morris

was a narrow one, upholding the Commission's finding of a
lack of a competitive impact in the particular circumstances of
this significant minority interest in a competitor.10 2 However,
the judgment did clarify a point of great industrial and legal
importance. Perhaps more significantly, it seemed to give the
Commission the added impetus it needed to push the Merger
Regulation for adoption by the Council, with all the wellment of Competition Policy, supra note 1; Peter 0. Sutherland, EEC Enforcement Policy:
Recent Developments and Future Prospects, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 325, 331
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987).
97. Remia BV and Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia N.V. v. Commission, Case 42/
84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.
98. Nutricia/de Rooij and Nutricia/Zuid-Hollandse Conservenfabriek, O.J. L
376/22 (1983), [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 165.
99. Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, Case
161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414; see Michel Waelbroeck, The
Pronuptiajudgment: A CriticalAppraisal, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 211 (Barry
E. Hawk ed., 1987).
100. British American Tobacco Co. and R.J. Reynolds Indus. v. Commission,
Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4487, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 24.
101. Philip Morris/Rembrandt/Rothmans (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 21, 1984) (not
yet reported) (rejecting complaint); see COMMISSION FOURTEENTH REPORT, supra note
16,
98-100.
102. See Mario Siragusa, Current Procedural and Litigation Aspects of Mergers and
Takeovers, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 509 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); Christopher Bellamy, Mergers Outside the Scope of the New Merger Regulation-Implicationsof the
Philip Morris Judgment, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 22-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1989).
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known impacts that instrument has had and will have on the
practice of EEC law.
O. 'Wood Pulp-CourtofJustice, 1988; 113 Commission, 1984 'o
In setting a basis of jurisdiction over non-EC companies
not far from the "effects" doctrine, °5 the Court by and large
confirmed the position the Commission had long held and
thus solidified the broad geographic significance of EEC law, in
a, way bound to extend the geographic area of counsel involved, as well as the lives of those counsel already involved.
Of course, a list of cases central to development of counsel's job and role could be much longer, and the above list
omits a number of cases of capital importance to the development of EEC law as such. We shall stop with the listing of
these cases and content ourselves with noting certain additional cases in progressing through the other points.
V. SOURCES OF LA WAND PRECEDENTS
In the early days of EEC competition practice, counsel
looked eagerly for guidance as to official interpretations of the
rules, "precedents" of any kind. There were so few cases, and
those that did exist left so many points open, that counsel
called upon to interpret the rules on a regular basis were constantly alert for any kind of indication of how officials might
react to a certain kind of business activity. Even twenty years
ago there was little case law and few books of commentary, and
the commentary was a bit speculative. A speech by the Director-General was big news for those seeking all possible clues
for problem solving. It would perhaps be excessive to say that
today there is proliferation, but there certainly is a great deal
of material. Counsel face a serious problem of how to manage
the use of it-what importance to attach to each form of evidence of official positions. The mass of raw material is such
103. A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyh'io v. Commission, Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116,
117, 125-29/85, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901.
104. Wood Pulp, OJ. L 85/1 (1985).
105. See Walter Van Gerven, ECJurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp
Judgment, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 451 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); see also Jos6
Phrez Santos, The Territorial Scope of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, in 1989 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 571 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).
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that for most practitioners it is not usable without a good deal
of "processing" done by others.
A question arises as to what extent this mass of material
provides answers. In some mature legal systems a practitioner
can expect to find a precedent for almost any given situation
that will give a considerable degree of guidance for the problem faced at the moment. In the EEC competition law practice, despite the quantity of material accumulated over the
years, that stage has not been reached. Two issues are raised:
what is available as guidance, and what is that material worth in
terms of quality and usefulness in predicting future official positions.
Apart from the Court of Justice's judgments, discussed
later, the most obvious candidates for precedents are the now
large number of cases decided by the Commission and published in the Official Journal. They are becoming more and
more accessible to practitioners as data banks and other
software mechanisms are developed. There had been about
340 formal decisions through June 30, 1992 based on Articles
85 or 86, not including Commission action related to the 121
notifications made to date under the Merger Regulation." 6
How many of these actually turn out to be useful as guidance is
another question.
Apart from the formal decisions, there are the notices of
proposed favorable action by the Commission, issued under
Article 19(3) of Regulation 17 and published in the OfficialJournal. Many of these are not followed'by a formal decision.
Counsel have long sincerely regretted that these notices often
provide only the vaguest kind of guidance. Not only are they
usually not explicit but also they often do not specify whether
the arrangement was thought entitled to a negative clearance
or rather to an exemption, much less which clauses fell into
which category and why.
The ranks of potential precedents are further augmented
by cases settled and covered only by a Commission press release, sometimes supplemented by newspaper reports. On oc106. In 1991, there were 13 decisions, which is slightly above recent averages.
These figures do not include "19(3)" notices of intention to take favorable action,
procedural decisions, decisions concerning State aids, or decisions under the competition provisions of the Coal and Steel Treaty. COMMISSION TWENTY-FIRST REPORT,
supra note 65,

73.
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casion a settled case is described briefly in the monthly Bulletin
of the European Communities or in the annual Commission Report on
Competition Policy without having been covered in a press release. 107
After the passage of a number of years in the implementation of EEC competition law, there began the organization of
the materials in a more systematic way. The most significant
step in the early period was the commencement in 1972 of the
Commission's publication of its annual Commission Report on
Competition Policy (the First, Report covering the ten years
through 1971). European monthly and quarterly reviews began providing opportunities for commentaries on specific EEC
competition cases or other issues. The Fordham Corporate
Law Institute began its series of published papers in 1974.
Both professors and practitioners began writing books, a
number of them of particular value, and by 1992 the mass of
available material had grown to such an impressive size that
effective use by the practitioner requires a series of judicious
choices.
Each counsel has his or her own preferred materials and
preferred manner of approaching study of a problem, and
these will be very different. For each counsel, however, there
remains the basic question: how much weight can be attached
to each of the various sources of official thinking.
As we have observed, formal Commission decisions are
the most obvious candidates for precedents. However, over a
period of time questions have arisen in the minds of counsel as
to whether the formal decisions in themselves actually carry
much weight with the Commission staff in treating new matters. A feeling exists that the DG-IV staff does not think in
terms of case precedents but rather of an uncodified set of
rules as to what will and will not be permitted. These rules
may or may not be applied on the basis of the policy objectives
behind them or the economic circumstances of the matter in
hand. The content of these rules does evolve over a period of
time, and new decisions can be evidence of this evolution, use107. The settled cases constitute the vast bulk of Commission "case law." In
1991, the Commission listed 835 cases having been closed during the year (146 by
sending comfort letters), as opposed to the 13 formal decisions on the substance of
Articles 85 and 86. Id.
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ful to that extent. Perhaps this is what we should expect. After
all, whatever may be the situation in civil law courts, civil law
counsel are not generally themselves precedent-oriented.
Most of the DG-IV staff think in civil code terms. Nevertheless,
there does seem to be an expectation, perhaps mistaken, on
the part of practitioners that new matters will be treated with
greater attention to decided cases and prior rulings, interpreted in light of policy objectives and economic circumstances.
Thus formal decisions applying Article 85(1) often seem
to be based on application of simplified rules. Exemption decisions applying Article 85(3) raise special considerations since
they necessarily involve application of discretion in a weighing
process. However, here also it is important for counsel to
study the manner in which the weighing process works in order
to be able to predict future use of discretionary authority.
Innovation is particularly impressive in Article 86 cases,
although the Court of Justice, by and large, has accepted the
Commission's imaginative lead. However admirable, the degree of innovation in Article 86 cases is such that serious
problems are still created for counsel attempting to give reliable advice. "Bright lines" have been created in abuse cases
that permit reasonably reliable predictions in regard to certain
kinds of behavior, but the range of potentially abusive behavior in some areas, such as refusals to deal, remains so broad
that counsel still often have great difficulty.' 0 8
Despite what has been noted about their lack of value as
precedents, it must be said that formal Commission decisions
have been of immense interest to counsel in developing a feeling as to the way future situations will be handled by the Com108. For a review of these various issues and others relating to Article 86, see
Eleanor M. Fox, Abuse of a DominantPosition under the Treaty of Rome-A Comparison with
U.S. Law, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 367 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1984); Eleanor M.
Fox, Price Predation-U.S. and EEC: Economics and Value, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 687 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); Luc Gyselen, Abuse of Monopoly Power Within the
Meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: Recent Developments, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 597 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); Thomas E. Kauper, Whither Article 86? Observations on Excessive Prices and Refusals to Deal, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 651 (Barry

E. Hawk ed., 1990); Valentine Korah, A Comment on ProfessorFox's Paperon Article 86, in
1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 423 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1984); Michel Waelbroeck, BiAnnual Review of EEC Competition Cases 1989-1991, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
Il1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992).
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mission-and that, after all, is the basis of counselling in EEC
competition law. Formal decisions have provided an incomplete but almost inexhaustible guide to official thinking.
Whether the decisions are long or short, right or wrong, carefully drafted or less well put together, useful pieces of "advice"
can be gleaned. Even a decision which on the surface may appear banal may contain a useful tip.
In view of the treasures of insight available from formal
Commission decisions, it was with some unease that counsel
saw the Commission apparently moving away from formal decisions toward comfort letters, in an effort to handle the overflow of pending matters and give more rapid answers still providing a degree of security. Of course, comfort letters had
been around for some time. They were considered no threat
to case law. However, when in 1982 the Commission instituted a practice of issuing comfort letters following a "19(3)"
notice, 0 9 it was feared that the development would reduce the
supply of formal decisions. Clearly the new practice could be
expected to be beneficial in facilitating administration of cases,
as well as in allowing parties to go forward with an operation
when they were willing to do so with a comfort letter of this
particular kind but otherwise would have required a formal decision.110 The fear, however, was that the Commission in concentrating on "19(3)" notices to be followed by comfort letters
would turn its attention away from writing full explanations in
formal decisions."' The "19(3)" notices may be of some value
as indications of Commission positions or attitudes, and as
such help counsel. Occasionally they even establish parame109. Such a notice is meant to give third parties the opportunity to object. See
Council Regulation No. 17, supra note 3, art. 19(3), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at
92; see also COMMISSION TWELFrH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
29-31 (1983).
110. Indeed, issuing more formal decisions did not offer a real alternative to
reduce the back-log, because the Commission was incapable of processing formal
decisions in regard to all pending cases. From that point of view, the development of
the comfort letter issued following a "19(3)" notice was no loss to the development
of case law.
111. In practice, there seemed to have been no substantial lessening of formal
decisions in the first part of the 1980s. However, in the three-year period ending in
1991 the Commission issued considerably fewer decisions per year on the substance
of Articles 85 and 86 than it had in the preceding six years. The use of the "19(3)"
notice plus comfort letter does not seem to explain this evolution. In 1991, the Commission issued only five "19(3)" notices followed by comfort letters, compared with
13 decisions. See COMMISSION TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, supra note 65, 73.
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ters that serve as clear limits on what will be approved in the
future. Counsel have long felt, however, that they could be
much more useful than they are with a bit more effort on the
Commission's part.
In terms of sources of EEC competition law, the Court of
Justice's judgments have served a different role and are used in
a different way.' 12 In terms of volume, the Court ofJustice has
been producing about as many competition law judgments
each year as the Commission produces decisions on the substance of Articles 85 and 86. Counsel have not always found
the Court of Justice's judgments easy to interpret. The difficulty of producing a wholly coherent judgment when the Court
of Justice acts per curiam is obvious. On the other hand, no
one can contest the authority of the Court of Justice's judgments (except to the extent that the judgments of the Court of
First Instance of the European Communities (the "CFI") are
subject to review by the Court ofJustice), whereas many counsel consider the Commission decisions more in the nature of
"allegations" and sometimes refer to them as such. The Commission itself certainly studies the Court's judgments with care,
although from the point of view of enforcement policy has not
always been seen by' counsel to follow the Court of Justice's
lead. When the Court of Justice refrains from overturning a
Commission decision, the Commission (and counsel also) may
act as if the Commission's approach was entirely justified,
seeming not to follow through on the bases of the Court of
Justice's judgment. 1 3 In this respect, it seems likely that the
112. Various aspects of the Court ofJustice's role in development of EEC Competition law are reviewed inJ. Mertens de Wilmars, Statement of Reasons and Methods of
Interpretation in the Case Law of the EC CourtofJustice Relating to Articles 85 and 86, in 1987
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 607 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988); Francis G. Jacobs, Court of
Justice Review of Competition Cases, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 541 (Barry E. Hawk
ed., 1988); Gordon Slynn, EEC Competition Law from the Perspective of the Court ofJustice,
in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 383 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1986); Bastiaan van der
Esch, The Principlesof Interpretation Applied by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities and their Relevance for the Scope of the EC Competition Rules, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 223 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992), reprinted in 15 FORDHAM INT' L.J. 366 (19911992); Michel Waelbroeck,Judicial Review of Commission Action in Competition Matters, in
1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 179 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1984).
113. When the Court ofJustice held in L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, Case
258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278, that an exclusivity clause did not
necessarily constitute a restriction under Article 85(1), the Commission showed no
eagerness to develop the underlying principle. Likewise, after Remia BV and Verenigde Bedrjven Nutricia N.V. v. Commission, Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545,
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weight of Court of Justice precedents will grow, and probably
change the nature of practice to a considerable extent, as the
CFI issues more and more detailed opinions covering a wide
variety of legal issues."t 4
VI. THE PRACTITIONER AND THE COMMISSION
A. Interaction of Counsel with the Commission Staff
Each EEC competition lawyer has had his own experiences
with the staff of DG-IV, and could no doubt line up a string of
anecdotes, a few amusing, others less so. How can one make
sense out of such a mass of experiences without falling into the
trap of forming generalizations that would be unfair to the
staff, and occasionally to counsel? Maybe it is not possible.
For many counsellors in EEC competition law, the practice of the law has been above all that of interaction with the
staff of DG-IV. The special nature of the EEC competition law
system requires continuing contacts with the staff, in part because of the exemption process. In the Community the situation is somewhat different from that existing in the United
States, where consultation with federal authorities is not extensive except in the case of mergers subject to prior notification.
Armed with per se rules and the U.S. Rule of Reason, counsel
in the United States will normally arrive at their own conclusions as to the risk of damages, fines and non-enforceability,
only rarely seeking a Business Review Letter from the U.S. Department of Justice.
In the case of EEC practice, the considerations are different. The same risk evaluation takes place, but each element
has a different weight. The risk of having damages awarded by
a national court is, for the time being, still remote. In regard
to fines, while the Commission is able to surprise counsel in
application of its fining policy, fines are more or less predictable in regard to those kinds of situations in which official guidance might likely be sought. As to enforceability, when it de[1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, the Commission long failed to exploit in new areas the possibilities of the Court's judgment accepting without exemption the validity of appropriate
non-compete clauses protecting the buyer of a business.
114. The prospects for the CFI were examined in John Temple Lang, The Impact
of the New Court of First Instance in EEC Antitrust and Trade Cases, in 1987 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 579 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988).
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pends mainly on the view of the DG-IV staff as to the need for
and availability of an exemption, their views at an early stage
may well be important.
As to the actual experience of counsel with the Commission staff, this Article will not undertake to award performance
notes to the staff as a whole, or to any particular member of the
staff, although the comments given may reflect favorably or unfavorably on the staff, the system, and counsel. As noted, the
perspective from which comments are given will obviously vary
widely from one counsellor to another, depending on the nature of that person's practice and the individual's approach, as
well as on the accidents which life produces.
The principal themes which come to mind in connection
with such a review are accessibility, objectivity, delays and the
end result. Obviously, some of these are closely related to
other topics of this Article. Experience with the Merger Task
Force will be covered in a subsequent section of this Article.
1. Accessibility
The judgment may be ventured that the key to the degree
of success that has been obtained by the Commission in the
difficult administration of a system of this kind is the accessibility of the staff to meetings with counsel and executives for preliminary review. Without such availability in a system that is so
much based on automatic condemnations and discretionary
exemptions, the system would probably by and large have become discredited in the eyes of the business community. This
possibility to consult on short notice with the DG-IV staff has
thus tempered considerably the uncertainties and delays inevitably raised by the dichotomy between Articles 85(1) and 85(3)
and the exemption process.
Of course the question arises-access to whom, in what
Directorate or section, and at what level? In the early days the
structure of DG-IV was somewhat different, as many counsel
will recall. One group, in Directorate A, was involved mainly
in inspections, and most companies were not eager to volunteer to seek their guidance. In the other Directorates there was
relatively little specialization of staff by product, but a certain
focus on types of legal issues. For one particular company,
thus, there was not necessarily much continuity in the identity
of the staff members with whom they dealt. However, the
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present organization of DG-IV has now been in place for some
time, and one tends to forget that there was ever anything else.
The situation will be commented on in light of the present organizational structure.
As a result of the organizational changes, when a problem
arises in regard to a particular product or service, it has almost
always been possible to identify, in advance of any overture,
which Director and which section chief will ultimately be in
charge-although on occasion jurisdictional questions as between Directorates within DG-IV have created problems for
counsel and companies. And these product-specific staff are
usually the first persons counsel will contact once a decision to
do so is made. Occasionally that decision has depended upon
an evaluation by counsel of the probable reaction of the particular staff members expected to be involved, based on prior experience. Inevitably counsel have found wide differences in
approach, sometimes based on national origin in the case of
younger staff members, in personality, and in reaction time.
In any event, when counsel has asked the DG-IV staff for a
meeting, the request has almost always been accepted, usually
on short notice. Normal conditions, such as providing written
data in advance, may be attached. And the ready availability of
the staff for discussions, by and large, has continued throughout the period that the matter is pending before the Commission. That has been the rule, and it no doubt will continue to
be the rule, although we can imagine that the staff's patience
may be sorely tried at times and that they may wonder whether
their good nature is not being taken advantage of. So much
for accessibility. What comes of it?
2. Objectivity
Access to the Directorate handling the matter has, quite
understandably, not always been sufficient to keep counsel
happy. They have not on every occasion been convinced that
the Commission staff is viewing the matter in the correct way,
that is, the same way as counsel, and therefore are inclined to
think that the staff lacks objectivity."15 The well-known com115. From the early days, questions have arisen as to whether the Commission
tends to discriminate on the basis of nationality, which first meant against U.S. multinationals, and later also againstJapanese companies. The prominence of U.S. com-
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plaint that the Commission staff, acting as prosecutors, are not
in a good position to be objective arises even in this early
stage, in non-contentious matters as well as in Commissioninitiated proceedings. Has there indeed been such a bias
which has impeded fair and expeditious handling of matters at
the level of dialogue with the companies? Perhaps the situation is not as bad as some commentators have suggested. The
DG-IV staff is, by and large, composed of a serious group of
lawyers and economists who are committed to enforcing the
EEC competition rules. They may occasionally be arbitrary, or
otherwise unreasonable, or misguided. Even counsel can be at
times. But it would be a mistake to think that there exists a
pervasive norm of bias.
Serious problems of seemingly arbitrary or unreasonable
acts on the part of the staff have arisen, of course. They have
at times appeared to result from a lack of realization on the
part of the staff as to the consequences of their actions-for
example, the impact on a company of the launching of an investigation or the extent of the burden on a company of demanding information which reflection would have shown was
not needed. Also, the power which the staff wields directly
over companies, via the effect on companies of staff attitudes,
permits an arbitrariness, fortunately rarely clothed in arrogance, that has sometimes been discouraging to counsel and
injurious to companies. Solid evidence presented by companies can be summarily rejected by the staff on the basis of superficial preconceptions. This kind of thing will, of course,
happen in any administrative agency. It is a question of degree. Counsel generally have felt they can cope with such situations in DG-IV as long as they are faced with fundamentally
capable officials.
What safeguards have counsel found available over the
years when they have not been satisfied with the actions or proposed actions of the staff? There is the obvious possibility of
going over the head of the section-chief to the Director of the
Directorate within DG-IV which is in charge, but sometimes
panies in the list of defendants in the earlier period seemed to give some basis for
such a thought, as did the first large "exemplary" fine levied against Pioneer. It
seems unlikely, however, that a careful study would reveal that any discrimination
was involved.
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this can be seen, in advance, as likely to be counter-productive
for. one reason or another. Another possibility has been to
seek support from the policy staff in Directorate A, but the DGIV case-handler rarely welcomes this. Moreover, the extent to
which this is feasible in a given situation has been and will
probably remain uncertain. In any event, the degree to which
it will be useful in a given situation has been difficult to assess.
Counsel are sometimes tempted to seek to "convert" the Legal
Service to counsel's position, but certainly DG-IV does not expect such action to be taken, and, presumably, the Legal Service itself would not normally expect such an approach. There
is also the possibility of "appeal" to the office of the DirectorGeneral, but it seems that counsel tend to utilize this recourse
with a degree of discretion, for various reasons.
Recourse to the level of the Commissioner's cabinet will
tend to come immediately to the minds of company executives.
This obvious possibility can be an important resource, in particular in matters of major industrial importance, but again
many considerations are involved. Over the thirty years of
EEC competition law, counsel have seen the role and attitude
of the Competition Commissioner and his cabinet change.
The more active participation of the Competition Commissioner in recent years has been a major event in the life of the
law as well as of practitioners, and it now seems that the future
development and enforcement of EEC competition law will depend on the identity of the Commissioner to a much greater
extent than would at one time have been thought possible.
The role of the Commissioner and his cabinet is thus subject to
continual re-evaluation by counsel. The resource also raises
the element of a possible accentuation of the political dimension. Indeed, the absence or presence of that dimension is a
recurring theme of EEC competition law practice. That dimension is not absent when a company decides to seek support
from another Directorate-General, most often from one involved in industrial policy, or from the cabinet of another
Commissioner, sometimes one whose home country has an interest in the affair. While such support may be available, it has
by and large appeared that it usually will not count for much
with DG-IV.
Still another dimension of support that has political overtones is that at the national level aimed at advice to be given to
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the Commission by the national members of the Advisory
Committee. Any general statement as to this process would
necessarily be vague, in view of the wide variations in situations and, in particular, attitudes at the national level. The
process of contacting the national authorities does in itself
seem a legitimate one. It is not essentially political, but rather
based on the same legal and economic criteria that should
guide DG-IV. Nevertheless, in practice it can become political;
such a possibility obviously is more pronounced in the case of
some national authorities than in others.
In any event, it has seemed to counsel of capital importance that there be someone else to whom they can turn when
they suspect that they are not getting as sympathetic a hearing
as the excellence of their arguments deserve. It is decidedly in
the interest of their mental and physical health that there be
some such safety valve, even if it does not turn out to be of a
great deal of use in a particular case.
3. Delays
A further recurrent issue has been that of the time it takes
the DG-IV staff to deal with matters. In this connection it
seems appropriate to refer to the DG-IV staff, or the "Services," rather than to the "Commission," since in almost every
case companies have been satisfied with assurances resulting
from an informal review, perhaps with a letter from the Services but with no formal approval from the Commission.
There has been wide criticism of the entire EEC competition law system on the basis of persistent delay. A great deal of
it is no doubt justified. However, it must be recognized that
the delay results, to a considerable extent, from the system itself. It is bound to be the case that there will be frustrating
delays in any structure in which the validity of agreements will
depend not upon compliance with rules but rather upon the
administrative decision of a small group of people working for
an economic area as large as the Community. So the problem
is implicit, but it is nevertheless fair to judge how the system
has worked and what has been done over the years to reduce
the size of the problem.
As to the performance of the DG-IV staff in meeting the
time requirements of companies, it is, of course, not possible
to make a general statement that one could expect to meet
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with broad acceptance among practitioners. Experience has
been so varied, and there will always be so many variables.
Goodwill and a general helpfulness in regard to the timing
problem seem to be the rule. Arbitrariness and a failure to
respond are not absent. Understaffing is endemic and is
bound to remain so. Product specialization among DG-IV staff
is positive but can cause bottlenecks that create real problems,
in particular when the product specialist disappears and there
is no immediate replacement. And since the DG-IV staff cannot possibly take care of everything that everyone expects
them to do, there has always been the question of priorities
and allocation of resources. The priority that DG-IV has given
to matters has no doubt been subject to a considerable amount
of planning," 6 but in the end a significant part of the actual
giving of priority has so far apparently been subject to fortuitous circumstances.
Another factor influencing the time it takes the staff to respond in any given matter is that of the capacities of the staff
members involved. A constant challenge for those responsible
for running DG-IV has been the recruiting of the best possible
candidates for staff positions. Without undertaking to judge
the success in this regard, we can simply note that the process
is bound to be a major part of the foundation of any degree of
success that is achieved in carrying out what is clearly a most
demanding task of making DG-TV function properly. This factor would appear to be more important in reducing delays, as
116. Priorities are established in an annual work program, not available to the
public. A general order of priorities is stated in the Commission's draft Notice on the
Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty by National Courts, referred to
in the COMMISSION TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, supra note 65,

70. Section II of the

currently available draft notice, IV/1009/91 - EN Rev. 1., states that the Commission
intends to give priority to notifications, complaints, and own-initiative proceedings
having "particular political, economic or legal significance for the Community." The
draft goes on to suggest that notifications without "general significance" will normally be dealt with by comfort letters but that complaints without particular significance should be handled by national courts or national competition authorities. Implementation of such a policy would, of course, radically change the role the Commission has so far played as a complaint-handler, and would no doubt frustrate many
would-be complainants, given that expectations have been built up over a period of
years by the willingness the Commission has so far shown to pursue well-founded
complaints. The CFI recently advanced the law on these points in Automec Srl v.
Commission, Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter Automec II]; see infra text accompanying notes 132-38 (dealing
with EEC competition law in Member State courts).
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well as in producing good end results, than the number of officials involved.
Whatever the causes of the delay in a particular case may
be, those running DG-IV have been able to take appropriate
measures only when they know that an unsatisfactory hold-up
exists. Counsel have had an opportunity to make those in
charge aware of such problems. Aside from the obligation to
complain, counsel have not, however, generally felt the need
to sink into resignation. It has usually been possible at least to
take steps to improve the situation by making clear from the
beginning of dealings with the DG-IV staff on a particular matter what the real needs for urgency are, and then cooperating
to provide complete and accurate information as needed to
meet the time constraints. Obviously such precautions have
not always resolved the problem.
4. Quality of the Result
As to the further dimension of interaction, the end result,
we have already considered certain elements that enter into it,
in particular objectivity. But what about the quality of the
product that comes out of the interaction? That product is
normally in the form of settled cases, not formal decisions, and
both settled cases and formal decisions can involve concessions or undertakings on the part of the company. 117
The majority of matters brought before the Commission
are closed with little difficulty, and little inconvenience for the
parties."" In more difficult cases, there is no doubt that the
Commission has often imposed settlement conditions that, in
retrospect, seem difficult to justify on an objective basis. The
issue then becomes whether the Commission's action was
high-handed, or simply misguided. No doubt there have been
occasions of both. On the whole, however, it seems fair to say
that the dialogue that has resulted in a settlement of a matter,
or in an adjustment of an agreement to permit exemption, has
117. See Ivo Van Bael, The Antitrust Settlement Practice of the EEC Commission, in
1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 759 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1986) [hereinafter Van BaeI,
Antitrust Settlement Practice].
118. In 1991, as the Commission announced in its COMMISSION TWENTY-FIRST
REPORT, supra note 65,
73, 676 cases were closed because the agreements were no
longer in force, they had no significant impact, the complaints had become moot, or
no anticompetitive practice was found.
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most often produced a situation which the parties consider
compatible with their basic business interests. Still, they may
be disappointed as to the obligation to change aspects of their
arrangements when they are not at all convinced of the need.
Thus, in the end, while much patience can be required on
the part of counsel, the accessibility of the Commission staff
which makes dialogue possible has seemed, by and large, to
produce results consistent with a realistic enforcement of EEC
competition policy, despite the obstacles posed by the exemption process.
B. Procedure Before the Commission

In the practice of EEC competition law over the first thirty
years, for many counsel the most stimulating experience has
been the handling of cases before the Commission, from the
time of the beginning of an investigation, through the answering of Statements of Objections, through the Oral Hearing,
and during this process and afterwards, negotiating with the
Commission on amendments to agreements or on undertakings. The rules of the game have not always been clear. However, over a period of time the procedures in regard to on-thesite inspections, business secrets, access to the file and other
such matters have become developed. 1 9 In regard to procedural safeguards to protect fundamental rights, it would be unfair to say that the Commission has been insensitive, but there
have been problems. During many years counsel had the impression that when they objected to the Commission's position, only a small percentage of the points raised against the
Commission during review of decisions in Luxembourg would
be accepted by the judges. Largely as a result of continuing
efforts by counsel, the law has now moved into what may be
considered a mature procedural system.' 20 Recent action by
the CFI has cast a new light on the role of procedural technicalities. 121
119. See Helmut W. Kreis, Commission Procedures in Competition Proceedings: Recent
Reforms in Practiceand Law, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 145 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1984); see also Van Bael, Antitrust Settlement Practice, supra note 117. The matter is
regularly followed in a separate section of the Commission's annual Reports. See, e.g.,
46-48.
COMMISSION FOURTEENTH REPORT, supra note 16,

120. See Edward, ConstitutionalRules, supra note 90.
12 1. Re the PVC Cartel: BASF AG v. Commission, Joined Cases T-79, 84-86,
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Throughout the thirty-year period, a fundamental issue of
contention has been what counsel describe as the dual role of
the Commission as "prosecutor" and "judge." Much has been
said about this subject by commentators, and the issue has
even come before the Court ofJustice. t 22 The issue relates to
every stage of enforcement activity-for example, from the
time members of the DG-IV staff make "dawn-raids." While
the Commission staff claim they are not really "prosecutors,"
presumably on the ground that EEC law is not of a criminal
nature, they are certainly considered by companies as such,
and for present purposes we shall retain that appellation. Of
course counsel expect a prosecutor to search aggressively for
documents that might show evidence of violations when there
is good reason to think that such documents exist, but there is
a limit, and it is not clear that the contours of that boundary
are as yet well enough defined.
A new stage of the dual-role problem comes when the
Commission starts evaluating the documents it has obtained,
either in searches or as a result of sending out Article 11 letters. When the Commission has the information it thinks it
needs, where does it go from there? The Commission often
has appeared to counsel to make up its mind once and for all
without waiting for the views of the parties concerned. 1 23 In
89, 91-92, 94, 96, 98, 102 & 104/89, [1992] E.C.R. -,[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357 (Ct.
First Instance). The Commission has appealed the CFI's judgment. Case C-137/92
P, OJ. C 152/18 (1992).
122. In SA Musique Diffusion Frangaise, a distributor sought annulment by the
Court ofJustice of the Commission's decision in Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment, O.J. L 60/
21 (1980), [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 457, on the ground of such a dual role. SA Musique
Diffusion Frangaise, Joined Cases 100-03/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R.
221. The Court ofJustice rejected the request on the ground that the Commission is
not a "tribunal" within the meaning of the Human Rights Convention. SA Musique
Diffusion Frangaise,[1983] E.C.R. at 1827, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. at 315. The Commission
has shown that it is aware of and sensitive to such comments. Upon reorganization of
DG-IV in 1984, merging the inspection unit into the case-handling Directorates, the
Commission took the occasion to explain that the move would not worsen the situation because the coordination unit would help maintain the equilibrium. CoMMIsSION FIFTEENTH REPORT, supra note 16,

45.

123. The discussion in the text covers those situations in which the Commission
has initiated an investigation or has satisfied itself that a complaint is well-founded.
At the stage of receiving a complaint, the Commission typically has allowed the target
of the complaint an opportunity to comment. It then normally has allowed the complainant the chance to make observations on those comments. These exchanges can
continue for a year or more, and if a Statement of Objections is finally issued, it may
in fact fairly represent the Commission's considered judgment after having heard
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other words, it prepares and sends out the Statement of Objections and later finds it most difficult to depart from these "provisional" conclusions. While the Statement of Objections is
only a formal charge, and is to be followed by written answers
and normally a formal Oral Hearing, over time counsel have
gotten the impression that it is not very likely that a company
can make DG-IV change its mind on the fundamental issues
involved. Should this be interpreted to mean that the Commission's prosecutorial mode has continued throughout the
decision-making process? A suspicion has long existed among
counsel that this is the case.
If the responsible Directorate in DG-IV appears to counsel
to have sold itself on the outcome before the parties are fully
heard, what resources have been available to parties? The
Hearing Officer is one resource. The procedure before the
Commission in connection with the Oral Hearing following a
written response to a Statement of Objections some time ago
became a focal part of the problems of both due process and
objectivity. The institution of the Hearing Officer was established in 1982, in response to criticisms from legal and industrial circles on these points. It is fair to ask, a number of years
later, what has been the experience of counsel with this effort
to achieve these objectives.

24

It is obvious that the functioning of the present hearing
procedure cannot easily be judged by any single practitioner.
Counsel to a party in a proceeding can tell whether that hearing seemed to work properly or not. In particular, counsel will
question whether parties were given sufficient opportunity to
express their views and whether procedural safeguards were
applied. But surely an important function of the Hearing Officer is to attempt to counterbalance any lack of objectivity on
the part of the Directorate within DG-IV which has acted as
prosecutor. The success or failure of this particular objective
virtually everything the parties have to say. In such circumstances, it is less surprising
if the Commission is reluctant to change its mind in the course of the more formal
stage of the proceeding.
,.
124. For the viewpoint of a Hearing Officer, see Hartmut Johannes, The Role of
the Hearing Officer, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 347 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); see
also COMMISSION EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLIcy 44 (1989) [hereinafter COMMISSION EIGHTEENTH REPORT]; Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer, in
COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note

16,

at

273.
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must, it would seem, for the most part remain a mystery for
counsel and companies.' 2 5 Presumably, counsel will rarely
know to what extent the Hearing Officer has intervened with
the Director, or at the level of the Director-General, or directly
26
with the Commissioner, to try to obtain greater objectivity.'
There are some indications that the staff of DG-IV does not
expect him to. Of course, continuing suspicions of lack of objectivity may provoke the feeling on the part of counsel that the
Hearing Officer has not intervened, or if he has that the effort
has not been successful.
It seems to be recognized generally by counsel that the
institution of the Hearing Office was a very useful step and that
the role of the Hearing Officer on the whole has inspired
greater confidence on the part of counsel in the decision-making process. The degree to which this is the case over a period

of time will, of course, inevitably depend to a considerable extent on the ability and attitude of the person who holds the

office.
The recent institution of the Court of First Instance may
have an impact on these matters. Much more than was the case
with the Court ofJustice, the CFI in effect is expected by counsel to serve as a sort of continuation of the procedure before
the Commission. Thus, while there is a great deal of addi125. The Court ofJustice has refused to order the Commission to allow parties
to a hearing access to the Hearing Officer's report. Imperial Chemical Indus. plc v.
Commission, Case 212/86, _ E.C.R. _, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 500.

126. The Commission notes that the Hearing Officer has referred his observations directly to the Commissioner in only a few cases. COMMISSION EIGHTEENTH
REPORT, supra note 124, 44. More recently, quite interesting indications were given
by Hartmut Johannes, the current Hearing Officer, in an unpublished paper delivered on October 8, 1992 in Paris at the Colloque International organized by the
Commission pour l'Etude des Communaut~s Europ~enes (C.E.D.E.C.E.). Mr. Johannes revealed that in 60% of the cases, his opinions reflected no disagreement with
the Directorate in charge of the case, either in regard to procedural or substantive
matters. In about 25% of the cases, he had proposed changes in the explanations
given by the Directorate to substantiate its position. As to fines, in about 10% of the
cases the Hearing Officer had taken the position that, contrary to the proposal of the
Directorate, there should be no fine with respect to some or all of the parties, most
often because the parties could not in the circumstances be considered to have acted
"intentionally or negligently." In regard to the remaining five percent of cases, the
Hearing Officer considered either that there had been no infringement of Articles 85
or 86 of the EEC Treaty or that due process had been withheld by the Commission in
a significant way through insufficient periods allowed for defense, incomplete or unclear statements of objections or insufficient access by the parties to the Commission's file.
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tional effort, time and cost involved, counsel can now be assured at least of the opportunity to attempt to obtain redress
before the CFI for shortcomings of the Commission which previously went uncorrected. These would include shortcomings
that seem to result from the Commission's dual role. Counsel
appear inclined to take advantage of this opportunity and the
CFI ready to assume the task. In any event, counsel may also
hope that the likelihood of review by the CFI of these aspects
of the Commission's decisions will in itself help to guarantee
care by the Commission in observance of safeguards and objectivity in evaluation of evidence.
VII. THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS AND OF ECONOMISTS
From 1962 onwards, EEC competition lawyers have been
asking themselves what role economic analysis will play in determinations under Articles 85 and 86. No one can reasonably
disagree that EEC competition law is based on economics.
The Court ofJustice made clear at an early stage that each case
must be judged in its economic context, in language that
should not have been surprising.1 27 Nevertheless, counsel
have continued to wonder what this principle will mean in
practice: whether the law will be applied by the Commission
and the Court of Justice as an economic law, as opposed to
somewhat of a codified law subject to an occasional degree of
economic analysis. It is hard to conceive a question more central to the practice of EEC competition law. The suspense has
continued over the years. In each situation, counsel have had
to ask themselves whether they should undertake a full economic defense of their position, in particular whether the possibility that such evidence would be taken into account was
great enough to warrant the cost and possible delay.
The need for decisions as to the possible pertinence and
utility of economic analysis has arisen at every stage of the
practitioner's professional life. 128 When a company asks for
127. Soci~t6 Technique Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm, Case 56/65, [1966]
E.C.R. 235, 248, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357, 374.
128. The need for economic evidence arises even in regard to allegations of
offenses that are as close as EEC law comes to per se rules. In defense of a cartel case
where the charge is based upon express agreement among competitors to allocate a
market, an economic argument may establish mitigating circumstances that will affect
the amount of the fine.
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guidance on the provisions of an agreement being negotiated,
a question can arise as to whether a risk of fines exists, or perhaps as to whether a good-faith defense can be made, and the
economic context is highly relevant. But up to what point will
that relevance be recognized? What would the Commission
say if the matter were eventually to come before it? Would the
defense save the agreement, mitigate fines, or even save face?
Counsel have been obliged to make predictions based on uncertain but generally pessimistic ideas as to the reception of
economic evidence at the working level in DG-IV.
When the situation involves early discussions with the
Commission on a pending matter, the same question becomes
more acute. Counsel have had to guess whether the DG-IV
staff will give a "knee-jerk" reaction on such fundamental issues as the relevant market-or if instead they will stop to reflect on the economics presented to them.
When a matter reaches the stage of defending a company
before the Commission, the focus changes again. Counsel
have had to prepare for the case, and in that connection decide
what effort it is worth making to establish a position by the use
not only of developed economic arguments but also of the testimony of independent economists.
Counsel generally have not been optimistic over the years,
to say the least, about the impact of their own economic arguments or even the testimony of independent experts in Commission proceedings. Evaluations by individual counsel will, of
course, result from individual impressions. A survey of case
law can at the best give only a limited view of what is going on,
in particular because most of the Commission's work is not reflected in decided cases. In any event, the situation cannot be
understood without looking at institutions and attitudes.
It is of interest to focus a moment on the role of independent economists, and to compare the situation in the Community with that in the United States. In the United States professional economists are listened to with respect by the antitrust
agencies and the courts, even though the structural situation is
the same: an independent economist brought forth by a party
will be one who supports the position of that party, and two
opposing parties will have opposing economists if the case is
before a court. In the Community economists are not listened
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to with disrespect, but they seem simply not to be listened to
enough. Why the difference? A number of partial explanations may be found, their relative importance varying from situation to situation. Sometimes the economist in the Community has no background in competition law, does not understand the legal issues, and insists on preparing testimony on
the wrong economic issues. Sometimes the economist speaks
in such elevated economic terms that laymen, including most
DG-IV staff members, who are not economists, have little
chance of understanding him. 129 Counsel bear a heavy responsibility, of course, to reduce the frequency of these situations by helping independent economists to explain clearly or
by summarizing in clear terms the economic testimony given.
Apart from these considerations, there seems to exist a
certain skepticism on the part of the Commission about the
utility of an economist's testimony. If there is a complaining
party it may have its economist, and of course if it does the
defendant will probably feel obliged to retain its own. It is not
rare that these two sets of economists disagree, and in any case
the Commission may ignore them both, perhaps considering
that they cancel one another out.
When it is the Commission rather than a complainant that
is taking the initiative against a company, the company may decide to retain an economist. The Commission will in any event
have available a staff economist, who will in principle have
been consulted at any early stage of the development of the
Commission's position. Once the Commission has adopted a
position in a case that is going forward to a formal procedure,
the Commission economist may, it is suspected, feel bound to
defend the Commission position, particularly in the Oral Hearing. Perhaps that makes some sense as a part of what is in effect an adversary proceeding. It gives the Commission's economist the opportunity to challenge the defendant's economist,
to draw him out and see to what extent he can defend his theses. However, counsel have wondered whether the role is less
129. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, In re Wood Pulp Cartel: A.
Ahlstr6m Osakeyhtio v. Commission, Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125129/85 (Eur. Ct. J. July 7, 1992) (not yet reported). The Advocate General stated
that "the Court was confronted with a substantial body of economic argument, referring at times to theoretical models which, whilst doubtless familiar to an economist,
are nevertheless, in my view at any rate, of manifest complexity." Id., slip. op. 333.
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one of "devil's advocate" than that of a prosecutor group determined to make its case, unwilling to consider the eventuality
of changing an approach announced in a Statement of Objections.
The record of the Commission's receptiveness to economic evidence is hard to decipher. Certainly formal Commission decisions increasingly include detailed economic evaluations. That development is relevant, but it is not an answer.
The question cannot be judged on such a quantitative basis, in
particular because such a large percentage of the Commission's work is not reflected in formal decisions subject to appeal.
So is the situation entirely bleak? What can counsel do?
The DG-IV staff members would certainly agree that they
should keep an open mind in regard to economic testimony, in
order to judge whether it is really convincing. And that should
not be too much to ask of the Commission, despite its dual
role. But counsel have been obliged all along to decide how to
make the best of a bad .situation, as they see it-by continuing
to develop and press economic arguments, or by limiting" such
efforts. In practice economic arguments have often been
pressed. It is not to beexcluded that they have very often
lacked credibility. And no doubt when the Commission listens
to a series of truly unpersuasive economic arguments, its skepticism is pushed to a new level, in particular in respect of the
company in question, but perhaps also generally in regard to
the likelihood of hearing anything interesting in the way of
economic testimony from companies. There is no doubt that
counsel can improve the quality of economic evidence offered.
What does the past suggest about prospects for the future? Is EEC competition practice doomed to continue in this
limbo where there exists too great a gap between the principle
of the central role of economic evidence and the practice of its
minor relevance? There are some reasons to think that the
use and acceptance of economic testimony will grow. First, as
we have noted, there are demands from all sides and they
surely will have some effect. The people running DG-IV are
certainly aware of the need to do something. The question is*
whether the institution can be moved to give effect to their
desires, either by having intensive economic training for legal
staff or having more economists with sufficient legal training.
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Apart from these considerations, it may be hoped that economists in Europe will become increasingly experienced and
learn how to give effective testimony, and that counsel will
learn better how to explain that testimony and organize it
when necessary. In addition, it may be that practice under the
Merger Regulation could have a favorable spill-over effect on
the rest of DG-IV. In the merger cases the structure of the law
and procedure and often the amount at stakein each transaction, plus the fact that each case requires a fairly detailed written explanation from the Commission, seem to have brought
about a fuller use of economic evidence. Experience to date as
well as a review of the decisions under the Merger Regulation
both suggest that this is the case. While it may be that practice
under the Merger Regulation is not directly translatable into
cases under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, for various
reasons,1 3 0 an impact should still take place. Counsel accustomed to using economic data in merger cases should be more
likely to do likewise in other cases, and DG-IV might with more
difficulty refuse to take into account economic arguments in
cases treated under Regulation 17 while doing so under the
Merger Regulation in regard to similar cases.
Another factor, perhaps of greater importance, is the influence on the Commission of prospective review of Commission decisions by the CFI. As to the reception'by the CFI of
economic evidence presented by the parties, the 'record is considerably more public than it is in the case of matters handled
at the level of the Commission, but it is probably too early to
draw definitive conclusions. It does appear that the CFI will be
willing to entertain economic arguments, to weigh them and to
reverse the Commission when appropriate.' 3 ' The prospect of
130. It is arguable, for example, that a relevant market and a dominant position
ought to be defined differently in structural cases covered by the Merger Regulation
than they are in behavioral cases under Article 86.
131. See, e.g., Re Italian Flat Glass: Societi Italiano Vetro SpA v. Commission,
Joined Cases T-68, 77, 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 302 (Ct. First
Instance) [hereinafter Flat Glass]. The CFI can only have been encouraged in this
direction by the Court ofJustice's judgment in Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, Case
234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 935, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210. See Valentine Korah, TheJudgment
in Delimitis: A Milestone Towards a Realistic Assessment of the Effects of an Agreement-or a
Damp Squib?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 167 (1992); K.P.E. Lasok, Assessing the Economic Consequences of Restrictive Agreements: A Comment on the Delimitis Case, 12 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 194 (1991).
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such a review, more complete than would have been given by
the Court of Justice before the CFI was instituted, can hardly
fail to have an impact on the practice of the Commission.
As a result of these developments, it may be that both
counsel and the Commission will be led to involve economic
experts at an earlier stage of the proceedings, in the development of a position, as opposed to bringing them in only after
adoption of a position which economic experts may find difficult to defend.
VIII. EEC Competition Law in National Courts
Despite the obvious potential importance of the national
courts in the practice of EEC competition law, these courts
have not had an important role so far. It seemed certain from
the beginning that they would eventually. Article 85(2) of the
EEC Treaty itself proclaims agreements incompatible with the
rule of Article 85(1) to be null and void. Also, it was recognized at an early date that national courts were, with unimportant exceptions, able to grant damages on the basis of national
tort law for violations of the EEC competition rules, and the
Commission began actively encouraging suits for damages and
other remedies. 132 But these efforts were a failure.
There were many reasons, most of them obvious, why
there was no rush to test the EEC rules in national courts. It is
not surprising that at the beginning the practitioner of EEC
competition law was not much concerned with national courts.
Counsel were, of course, required to think what might happen
in a national court should the other party to an agreement
raise the nullity defense of Article 85(2) in regard to one or
more specific clauses, or in regard to the entire agreement.
132. In 1966, the Commission published a brochure describing the possibility of
suing under national tort or similar law in the six countries then Member States.
COMMISSION, LA R9PARATION DES CONSQ-QUENCES DOMMAGEABLES D'UNE VIOLATION DES
ARTICLES 85 ET 86 DU TRAITf INSTITUANT

LA

CEE, s6rie concurrence No. 1 (1966).

Despite the reasonably clear legal situation, there apparently has not yet been a recorded award of damages based on Article 85 or Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. See
John Temple Lang, EEC CompetitionActions in Member States' Courts: Claimsfor Damages,
Declarations and Injunctions for Breach of Community Antitrust Law, in 1983 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 219 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1984); see also Ernst Steindorff, Common Market
Antitrust Law in Civil ProceedingsBefore National Courts and Arbitrators, in 1985 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 409 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1986); Stockmann, Trends and Developments,
supra note 26.
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But the other parties tended not to do so, and it occurred to
very few to seek temporary injunctions or other remedies in
national courts on the basis of EEC law. In any event, it was so
easy to complain to the Commission, at little cost, and see what
came of it. The Commission was found to be most receptive to
complaints, and that too was understandable.
The situation did change somewhat over time, but only
very slowly. A consciousness of EEC competition law had to
become more generalized throughout the Community for
most counsel in national litigation even to think of the EEC
defense in a suit for enforcement of a contract, or of the many
other possible implications in national court practice of EEC
competition law. Now, thirty-five years after Article 85(2) went
into effect, the EEC consciousness of the legal profession is
much better developed, and litigation of EEC issues in national
courts is becoming a more regular part of EEC practice. There
have been a number of important and instructive cases. The
1
total volume is not great, however. 33
The Commission has often stated that it has the main role
in the application of the EEC competition rules. Of course, it
has an exclusivity in regard to exemptions (although national
courts are able to interpret block exemption regulations, and
those regulations now cover many fields). However, taking a
realistic look at its own incapacity to take care of enforcement
all by itself, the Commission did, as noted, begin pushing at an
early date for the national courts to play a greater role. The
practitioner now is wondering what will happen, and when, if
ever. It is obvious that for the future of the administration of
EEC law, and thus for the life of the practitioner, a sharing of
the application of the EEC competition rules between the
Commission and the national courts would be a momentous
development. Complaints would be accepted by the Commission only if they were of political, economic or legal significance for the Community. Exceptions would be made by the
Commission when, because of the international nature of the
matter or otherwise, the national courts did not provide a real133. The Commission has been tracking national court decisions applying Community competition law. COMMISSION NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
109-18 (1990) (covering 1989 and listing 10 such cases); COMMISSION TWENTYFIRST REPORT, supra note 65, annex V.B. (summarizing 13 cases for 1991). It is not
known what percentage of the total the cases so reported might represent.
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istic alternative. 1
Despite the general indisposition of parties to raise EEC
law questions in national courts, and in particular to bring suits
based purely on EEC law in national courts, the situation has,
of course, arisen many times over the years and given counsel
the occasion for weird and frustrating experiences. Sometimes
the same issue of EEC competition law is pending before the
Commission and a national court in regard to the same situation. Difficult problems arise, and despite the passages in the
Reports on Competition Policy, the draft Notice on the application
of EEC law by national courts and the Automec Sri v. Commission
("Automec H") judgment, 3 5 the manner in which the Commission will deal with these situations is far from resolved. Hard
choices have been posed for counsel as well as for the DG-IV
staff. During the early years the Commission seemed prepared
to intervene on its own initiative to guide the national courts.
More recently the Commission has seemed hesitant to give an
opinion to a national court unless it has been solicited by the
court, perhaps upon a request by a party.
The most difficult problems arise when an agreement
before a national court has been notified to the Commission.
It may even be notified following a dispute arising in a national
court. Should the Commission adopt a "hands off" attitude
and let the matter be resolved on later reference to the Court
of Justice if necessary? Or should it wait to see whether the
national-court resolves the matter properly, and intervene later
if appropriate? The trial court may be outside the Community.
What impact would that have on intervention? Should the
Commission intervene before a national court if it is not happy
134. The subject'is treated succinctly in the Commission's Draft Notice on the
Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty by National Courts. In a recent
important judgment, the Tribunal confirmed that the Commission could reject a
complaint, after the Commission had examined the facts brought forth by the complaiinant, such rejection being based on the ground that the matter was not of sufficient importance to the Community to be treated by the Commission and could be
handled in a national court where, absent a showing to the contrary, the national
court was deemed able to give an appropriate remedy. Automec II, Case T-24/90,
[1992] E.C.R. -, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (Ct. First Instance). It seems likely that the
Commission will rely heavily on the Automec H judgment in seeking to get the national courts more deeply involved in the application of EEC competition law. For a
treatment of the subject of complaints prior to Automec H, see J.E. Ferry, The Sheriff
Needs a Posse, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 169 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992).
135. Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. _, [ 1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (Ct. First Instance).
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with pleadings one of the parties has filed in the national
court? Can counsel always expect a national court to show deference to the handling by the Commission of a notified agreement as to which the Commission has begun an examination?
The Commission's pending draft notice on the application of
EEC competition law touches on some of these questions.' 36
The present paper does not present the proper forum for
speculation as to answers. In any event, it may be said that the
lesson counsel have learned is to tread cautiously on these
thorny paths, where bad surprises may lurk around any corner.
Counsel can take little comfort in the thought that in these
difficult situations the DG-IV staff is often just as perplexed as
counsel. On the other hand, counsel will certainly want to be
as well informed as possible of the development of the Commission's attitude. To that extent, the Commission's current
efforts to complete a notice on the application of Articles 85
and 86 by national courts are laudable. After an initial thought
of virtually legislating in the area via a notice, the Commission
now seems content to draw. some general conclusions, which
ought nevertheless to be of considerable use.' 3 7 Regardless of
the definitive form that notice takes, it seems likely to create
endless problems of interpretation once matters start being
handled in significant numbers in national courts. The obstacles and unresolved legal issues are enormous. "Decentralization" is not for tomorrow. However, the movement is clearly
in that direction. The current prominence of "subsidiarity,"
provoked by debate on the Treaty on European Union (the
"Maastricht Treaty"), 38 is a further wind of change that is already recognized as affecting the enforcement of the EEC competition rules.
136. See supra note 116 (regarding Commission draft noti'ce).
137. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (regarding Commission draft notice). The current draft covers, although not in a detailed way, the principle of the
precedence of EEC law over national law as that principle applies to the enforcement
of exempted agreements. It emphasizes the need for the Commission to establish
priorities in deciding what cases it will take on. The most detailed provisions concern
the attitudes the national court should adopt toward the possibility of an exemption
and the cooperation the Commission would envisage.
138. Treaty on European Union, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
253 (1992).
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IX. THE MERGER REG UL4 TION
This Article has undertaken a retrospective of thirty years
of EEC competition law practice, and we arrive now at the
most recent major event-the 1989 Merger Regulation. 13 9 It is
important not only for immediately obvious reasons relating to
control of market structure but also because of a probable
longer-term impact in other areas of EEC competition law
practice. Of course we do not yet have much perspective, since
the Regulation went into effect only in September 1990, but
our perspective on earlier developments and our experience so
far with the Merger Regulation may together permit some insight on the possible impact of the Regulation.
First, and perhaps most obviously, the Merger Regulation
has added a considerable number of practitioners, of numerous nationalities. Those persons who divined the potential importance of this new practice area were not mistaken as to its
scope. And if indeed the Commission's jurisdiction is extended upon an expansion of the "Community dimension" at
the end of 1993, the change will obviously magnify the importance of the practice.
Practice under the Merger Regulation has shown a marked
similarity to practice under merger control laws of a number of
other countries, including the United States. And it is distinctly different in so many ways from practice based on Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. The main concepts under
the Merger Regulation that rely on prior EEC case law are, of
course, those concerning the existence of a dominant position
and the existence of a concentrative joint venture (or "partial
merger"). These are crucial concepts that cannot be separated
from prior law, although even these two concepts purport to
be defined by the Merger Regulation and its official notices. 4 '
Even from the procedural point of view there exists a new and
specific regulation, albeit of familiar terms. In addition, there
is a single Merger Task Force taking care of these matters, and
139. Merger Regulation, supra note 24, O.J. L 257/13 (1990).
140. See Bernd Langenheine, Substantive Review Under the EEC Merger Regulation,
in 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 481 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991); Jeremy Lever, Substantive Review Under the EEC Merger Regulation: A Private Perspective, in 1990 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 503 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991);James S. Venit, The Evaluation of Concentrations Under Regulation 4064/89: The Nature of the Beast, in 1990 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INST. 519 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991).
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one tends to deal with the same officials time after time. Immediate access and quick responses are the standard operating
procedure. Within an unprecedented time period detailed decisions are issued. The Merger Regulation has, in effect,
brought about a virtually new field of law, with its own body of
case law and its own practice. That body of law is growing at
an amazing rate. It is defined and accessible, almost immediately available in usable form.
As is well known, the Regulation represents the fruition of
a twenty-year process which began with the Commission's
1970 decision in Continental Can 1 4 t-an effort to regulate
changes in market structure, other than those brought about
by what are now called "cooperative" joint ventures. We shall
not consider here the practice of EEC merger law at that earlier stage. The situation has been fundamentally changed by
the arrival of the Merger Regulation.
Many of the innovations of the Merger Regulation as they
relate to work of EEC counsel are obvious: the first mandatory
notification rules, and the first subjection of the Commission to
strict time limits; allocation of jurisdiction in a rigidly precise
way, without precedent in EEC law, albeit on a politically determined basis;142 a notification requiring detailed data, in contrast to Form A/B, where the Commission only hopes for such
data; and a notification demanding an up-front definition of
the market, in contrast to Form A/B, which perhaps needs one
but does not demand it.143 The format has permitted the ac141. J.O. L 7/25 (1972), [1972] C.M.L.R. D11; see supra note 79 and accompanying text (regarding the impact of Continental Can on merger control); see also ErnstJoachim Mestmicker, Merger Control in the Common Market: Between Competition Policy
and IndustrialPolicy, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 20-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989);
Dieter Schwartz, New EEC Regulation on Mergers, Partial Mergers and Joint Ventures, in
1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 21-1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989).

142. In regard to jurisdiction, see Giorgio Bernini, Jurisdictional Issues: EEC
Merger Regulation, Member State Laws and Articles 85-86, in 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 611 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991); Jacques H.J. Bourgeois & Bernd Langeheine,
JurisdictionalIssues: EEC Merger Regulation, Member State Laws and Articles 85-86, in 1990
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 583 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991), reprinted in 14 FORDHAM INT'L
LJ. 387 (1990-1991); Martin Heidenhain, Control of Concentrations Without Community
Dimension According to Article 22(2) to (5) Council Regulation 4064/89, in 1990 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 413 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991).
143. Generally, in regard to these questions, see Christopher Jones, The Scope of
Application of the Merger Regulation, in 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 385 (Barry E.
Hawk ed., 1991); Colin Overbury & Christopher Jones, EEC Merger Regulation Procedure: A PracticalView, in 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 353 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991).
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cumulation of an enormous amount of experience in only a
two year period.144 .
The Commission was of course faced with an enormous
practical challenge when it began administration of the Merger
Regulation, for the adoption of which it had worked so hard.
The Commission's credibility was hanging in the balance.
Counsel and the business community soon agreed that the administration of the Merger Regulation was turning out to be a
big success. It is rare to see such unanimity on any one point
within the Community. The apparatus and traditions are in
place. Counsel would expect that the good functioning will
continue.
Two further points may be made about practice, both relating to the future. The first concerns the nature of decisionmaking in regard to merger cases. There are two important
issues that will affect practice. One is whether interim decisions to open in-depth investigations should be left to the vote
of all the Commissioners if any Commissioner so demands, as
opposed to the reported present practice of opening the "second stage" upon the decision of the Competition Commissioner, subject to the obligation on his part to inform the other
Commissioners in advance, and if requested, to meet with concerned Commissioners. The second is whether decisions
should be left to an independent body other than the Commission. These will not be pursued in detail in this Article, but we
can note their possible impact on practice. It is not clear
whether the two proposals would pull in opposite directions or
not, the former increasing political influence and the latter reducing it.' 4 5 For counsel devoted to the rule of law, as it can
144. Experience and other thoughts at the end of the first year were recorded in
Eleanor M. Fox, Merger Control in the EEC-Towards a European MergerJurisprudence, in
1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 709 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992); Barry E. Hawk, Joint
Ventures Under EC Law, supra note 83; Angus Maciver, The First Year of Enforcement
Under the EEC Merger Regulation: A View From the Trenches, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 751 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992); Michael Reynolds, The First Year of Enforcement
Under the EEC Merger Regulation: A Private View, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 649
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992).
145. The format of an independent body, designed 'along the German model,
would allow the decision of that body to be overruled by the Commission, which
could take into account grounds other than those of competition policy. This is now
the system in Germany, where the Minister of Economics can overrule the Federal
Cartel Office. In Germany, the system functions well, a.reversal rarely taking place.
A modification of the Community system would in principle be designed to allow
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be enforced in a system as impartial as possible and in the
course of hard-fought legal battles, a movement toward a system of results based on political influence would be a most disheartening one.
The second issue pointing to the future concerns the possible influence of the Merger Regulation, as well as of practice
under the Merger Regulation, and on practice in other areas of
EEC competition law. We have already had occasion to review
some of these points. It seems likely that there will be such an
influence and that the question is one of degree.
The most immediate and obvious change would concern
cooperative joint ventures. The possible influences are wellknown. Faced with a distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures which can require a degree of mystical
foresight to discern with infallibility (a gift not possessed by
most counsel), the question has arisen as to why they should be
treated so differently in procedural terms-in particular why it
should take so long to get a ruling on a cooperative joint venture. The Commission has accordingly undertaken to expedite
treatment of cooperative joint ventures. 146 What this implies,
and what the result may be, remain to be seen.
The relationship of cooperative and concentrative joint
ventures raises several problems of practice. One is whether in
"political" decisions in merger cases, but to protect the evaluations against a continuing and insidious political dimension that might otherwise develop. However,
whether such a Community system would work as well as does the German system is
open to question for various reasons, including the lack of a consensus on the value
of competition law enforcement in the Community and the possibility that the "independent" body would itself be subject to political influence.
146. On April 16, 1992, for example, the Commission published a notice of the
notification for exemption under Article 85(3) of a proposed joint venture by which
Allied-Lyons plc and Carlsberg A/S would merge their respective brewing and related distribution and wholesaling businesses in the United Kingdom into a joint venture to be named Carlsberg-Tetley. O.J. C 97/21 (1992). The form of notice followed the format of notices published in connection with the notification of concentrations under the Merger Regulation. This has been taken to suggest that the
Commission proposes to treat cooperative joint ventures with a structural dimension
within a time period similar t'the maximum set forth in the Merger Regulation for
review of concentrative joint ventures. Further light was provided by the recent announcement of the Commission's approval of Transpetrol, a cooperative joint venture between subsidiaries of Preussag AG and British Petroleum plc, which notes
explicitly that the Commission "concluded its inquiry within the same time limit as
that provided under the Merger Regulation." Commission Press Release, IP (92)
811 (Oct. 13, 1992); see Commission Press Release, IP (92) 52 (May 25, 1992)
(speech by Sir Leon Brittan).
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order to be entitled to expedited treatment the notification of a
cooperative joint venture should be made with the same completeness as notification of a concentration on Form CO. A
second question is whether the Commission will undertake to
resolve cooperative joint venture problems-and the evident
"non-equality" of expeditious handling of such joint ventures
vis-A-vis concentrative joint ventures, by resort to a block exemption,' 4 7 or whether a detailed notice, long planned, will
suffice. A third issue is whether the concept of ancillary restrictions will function in the same way outside operations covered
by the Merger Regulation. Of course, this is a point of substantive law, but it is one which goes to the heart of the practice by affecting counsel's approach to any situation.' 48 It
could well be substantially clarified in a future notice on joint
ventures.
We can also consider the question of interaction of counsel with the Commission staff, discussed above. Will the closer
interaction that has been seen with the staff of the Merger Task
Force lead both counsel and staff of Directorates B, C, and D
to pattern their conduct on the greater rapidity and definitiveness of response that has been seen under the Merger Regulation? One would hope that there will be an influence in this
direction, although the regulatory context of the Merger Regulation demands a close relationship and swift and sure reactions which Regulation 17 does not, and it seems in the nature
of things that too big a gap will remain.
We have already considered the availability and pertinence of sources of law and precedents.' 4 9 The Merger Regulation shows a revolutionary change in this respect. As we
noted, the practice under the Merger Regulation is to release,
rather rapidly, detailed letters which explain the basis of the
decision and which give helpful guidance to counsel for future
practice under the Merger Regulation. Precedents seem to
play a greater role here than elsewhere in EEC competition
law. This development could raise the expectations of counsel. How this aspect could be translated into practice is less
147. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text (discussing block exemptions).
148. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text (discussing sources of law
and precedents).
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clear, however. One possibility would be that DG-IV take this
development into account in drafting its own decisions as well
as its notices of proposed favorable action to be issued under
Article 19(3) of Regulation 17. However quite the reverse may
be the case. Seeing the short notices published by the Merger
Task Force in the OfficialJournal, the rest of DG-IV could well
wish to expedite matters by moving toward greater brevity.
In regard to the role of economics and economists,150
the
relationship between practice under the Merger Regulation
and under Regulation 17 bears a possibility of influence.
Again the question remains as to how it can be implemented in
the attitudes of the DG-IV staff. Counsel will be more accustomed to use economists. Economists will be more accustomed to thinking in terms of EEC law and to making
presentations to the Commission. Will the Merger Regulation
and its impact on others lead the DG-IV staff to be more willing to think along economic lines? This remains to be seen,
and practitioners will watch these developments and participate in them with great interest.
CONCLUSION
After all this retrospection, what general perception of
events can be formulated, and what does the future hold?
First, as to the role of the EEC competition lawyers: Have
they managed to serve the clients' interests and at the same
time been faithful to their duty toward the law? The intellectual challenge of the law, as well as that of spirited defense of
the client, have been met in exemplary fashion on countless
occasions. As the knowledge of the law expands within the
Community, the standards of practice seem to be improving.
No doubt they could be improved further through increased
emphasis on economics and more intensive reflection on the
scope of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. How about the ethical standards? EEC competition law counsel have been faced
with a difficult situation, participating in the administration of
the law on behalf of companies many of which do not believe
in the law. To that extent, perhaps they have shared the experience of tax counsel, and like tax counsel they have sometimes
150. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (discussing role of economics and economists in EEC competition practice).
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faced the problems of dealing with clients who will do what
they can to escape the law, even if it involves misleading public
authorities. It is not possible to know to what extent counsel
have met that challenge. It does seem important to recognize
the challenge. It is, of course, a challenge that applies also to
the Commission in its work-to inspire confidence in the determination of the Commission to follow the rules. Only when
both sides meet this challenge will the system function in a
proper way and bring the greatest degree of satisfaction to the
participants and the public.
Second, as to the Commission and the Community courts,
our retrospection suggests that the coping with the enormous
problems of implementing the system in an environment not at
all prepared for it has been commendable. The business community was not ready. Had Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty been submitted to a referendum, as the Maastricht
Treaty has been, the chances of their acceptance would have
been too thin to interest any betting agency in the outcome.
But there were wise leaders in the right places, and the system
has found a series of good administrators aware of the challenges and who have tried hard to remove the obstacles to an
effective system. They have contributed greatly to the building
of a unified market. As it becomes a reality they should be able
to devote a larger percentage of their work to ensuring the
existence of a competitive system. They need support at the
level of the Council and Commissioners, who may not always
be sufficiently informed. They also need the help of counsel in
connection with development of the law in the ways noted.
And that is the legal profession's responsibility.
Third, as to the future, it is amazing to see the extent of
interest of law students and young lawyers in pursuing a career
in which the application of the EEC competition rules will play
a big part. They can obtain good early notions at the universities and special schools, such as the College of Europe. The
real learning will come in practice. Let us hope that they will
now come to the practice armed with a sufficient grounding in
economics to allow them to play the full role that the scope of
the law demands.
Finally, the practice of EEC competition law has been and
will continue to be rich in non-material rewards of many kinds.
It provides a kaleidoscope of ever-changing factual situations
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and evolving legal rules in a moving political and macro-economic context. To what extent the Maastricht debate will
change the context remains to be seen. The Commission will
no doubt maintain its fundamental attributes for administration of the rules, even though it is now employing "subsidiarity" to promote decentralization to national courts. This
decentralization, which is clearly desirable, will be one of the
biggest challenges the system has faced, and it will provide major new challenges for counsel. Its prospects are far from
clear. But that is certainly the wave of the future. It is in the
nature of things, as is the development of national competition
laws and a growing activeness of national competition agencies, as well as the extension of the EEC substantive rules to
the European Free Trade Association countries.
The dynamics of the situation have been and will remain a
source of endless wonderment to counsel. Participating in
those dynamics can be exhilarating. Where will it all go? It
will be a great experience finding out.

